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llEPORT 



OF 



LIEUTEM^'T GENERAL U. 8. GRANT 

OF THE 

ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES-18G4-'G5. 



Headquarters Armies of thb UxtTED States, 

Washington, D. C, July 22, 1865. 

Sir : I liave the honor to submit the folhiwing report of the operations of the 
armies of the United States from the date of nij appointment to command the 
same: 

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea 
that active and continuous opei'atious of all the troops that could be brought into 
the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termina- 
tion of the war. The resources of the enem^^ and his immerical strength were 
far inferior to ours ; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory with a 
population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and rail- 
road communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies. 

The armies in the east and west acted independently and without concert, 
like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to 
great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops 
from east to west, re-cnforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to fuilough 
large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and 
do the work of producing for the support of their armies. It was a question 
whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by 
these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position. 

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that 
would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both north and 
south, until the military power of the rebelliou was entirely broken. 

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable 
against the armed force of the enemy ; preventing him from using the same 
force at difTcreut seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and 
the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carry- 
ing on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of 
the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there 
should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of 
our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land. 

These views have been kept coustantly in mind, and orders given and cam- 
paigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in con- 
ception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, 
and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I 
have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what 
I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole coiintry. 



At tlio date -wlien tliip report begins the situation of the contending forces 
was about as follows : The Missi.<sippi river was strongly garrisoned by federal 
troops from 8t. Louis, Missouri, to its month. The line of the Arkansas was 
also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi, north 
of that stream. A few points in southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, 
were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the 
Eio Grande. All the balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and 
Texas was in the almost undis])uted possession of the enemy, with an army of 
probably not less than 80,000 elllective men that could have been brought into 
the iield had there been sufiticient opposition to have brought them out. The 
ht-alove policy had demoralized tliis lorce so that probably but little more tliau 
one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. Eut the one- 
half, or 40,000 men, with the bands of guerillas scattered through Missouri, 
Arkansas, and along the Mississi})pi river, and the disloyal character of much 
of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep 
navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. 
To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially with the line of the; Ten- 
nessee and llolston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of 
'^I'ennessp.e. South of Chattanooga a small foothold had been obtained in Geor- 
gia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force 
at Dalton, Georgia. West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Vir- 
giiaia, with the exception of the northern border, the Potomac river, a small area 
about the mouth of James river covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort 
]\Ionroe, and the territory covered by the army of the I'otomac lying along the 
Iiapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coast footholds had 
been obtained at Plymouth, AVashington, and Kewbern, in Kortli Carolina ; 
Beaufort, Folly and IMorris islands, Hilton Head, Fort I'ulaski, and Port Royal, 
in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in Florida. Key West and 
Pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were block- 
aded by the navy. The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to Gen- 
eral Sherman and other commanders in March, 18G4, shows by red lints the 
territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion and at the opening of 
the campaign of 1SG4, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed 
to occupy. 

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large pop- 
ulation disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of 
road or river used in supplying our armies. In the south a reign of military 
despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy ca])able of bearing arms a 
soldier, and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for col- 
lecting deserters and returning them. This enabled the enemy to bring almost 
liis entire strength into the field. 

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Mississippi 
into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, his 
ablest and best generals. The army commanded by Lee occupied the south 
bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, 
covering and defending Richmond, the rebel capital, against the army of the 
Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position 
at Dallou, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great 
importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under Major General W. T. 
Sherman. In addition to these armies, he had a large cavalry force under For- 
rest, in northeast Mississippi ; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah 
valley, and in the western part of ^'irginia and (jxtreme eastern part of Ten- 
nessee ; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports 
where we had no foothold upon land. 

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the 
main objective points of the campaign. 



Mnjor General W. T. Sliermmi, who was appointed to the command of the 
military division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east 
of the Mississippi river to the Alleghanies, and the department of Arkansas, 
west of the Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating 
against Johnston. 

Major General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the army 
of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements 
of all our armies. 

General Slierman was instructed to move against Johnston's array, to break 
it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as ftir as he could, in- 
flicting all th.e damage he could upon their war resources. If the enemy in his 
front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability. 
while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him if it was in the power 
of the army of the Potomac to do so. More specific written instructions were not 
given, for the reason that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, 
and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute thcra to the fullest 
extent possible. 

Major General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red river against 
Shreveport, Louisiana, (which had been organized previous to my appointment 
to command,) Avns notified by me on the 15th of March of the importance it was 
that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found 
that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than Gen- 
eral Sherman had given his troups to be absent from their command, he would 
send them back at the time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the 
abandonment of the main object of the Red i-iver exj)edition, for this force was 
necessary to movements east of the Mississippi ; that should his expedition prove 
successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red river with such force as be 
might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood 
of New Orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory 
unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held ; that it might be 
a part of the spring campaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would 
be if troops enoxigh could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other 
movements ; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an ex- 
pedition ; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move from 
Arkansas, as suggested by him, (General Banks,) instead of a demonstration, 
as Steele thought advisable. 

On the 21st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, 
he was instructed as follows : 

" 1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, tliat you turn over the defenc 
of the l\ed rivei; to General Steele aud the nav}'. 

' ' 2d. That you abandon Texas entirely with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande. 
This can be held with four thousand men, if tiny will turn their attention immediately to for- 
tifying their positions. At least one-half of the force re(piired for this service might be taken 
from the colored troops. 

" 3d. By properly fortifying on the INIississippi river, the force to guard it from Port Hud- 
son to New Orleans can bf reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thou- 
sand more would then hold all the rest of the territory uecessary to hold until active opera- 
tions can be resumed west of the river. According to your last return this would give 
you a torce of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against Mobile. To 
this I expect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, you think the force here 
stated too small to hold the territory regarded sis necessary to hold possession of, I would say, 
concentrates at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against 
Mobile. With these and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in 
making a deuumstration, to.be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more irou-clads 
will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with which 
to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with the Admiral for his co-operation,. 
and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagmihi should 
be your base, but, from your long service in tluitUilf department, you will know Ijcst about; 
the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements else 



4 

%vlievp, tind yon caimot now start too soon. All I ■\vonUl now atl<l is, fliat yon coninionce the 
concei iiiition of yonr Ibices at once, rieserve a profound secresy of what you intend doing, 
and start at the earliest possible moment. 

"U. S. GEANT, Lieutenant General. 
"Major General N. P. Banks." 

IMnjor General Meade was instructed that Lee's army wonld be liis objective 
point ; tliat ■wherever Lee Avent lie wonld go also. For his movement two plans 
])resented themselves : One to cross the llapidan beloAv Lee, moving by his 
right tlank ; the other above, moving by his left. P]ach presented advan- 
i,igefc« over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee 
would be cut oft' from all chance of ignoring liichmond or going north on a raid, 
iiiit if we took this route all we did wonld have to be done whilst the rations 
we etarted with held out ; besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could 
not be directed how to co-operate. If we took the other route. Brandy Station 
could be used as a base of sup})lies until another was secured on the York or 
James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route. 

The following letter of instruction was addressed to ]\Iajor General B. F. 
Butler : 

"Fort Monroe, Va., April 2, 18C4. 

"Gknerai.: Tn tlie spring- canipaip-n, wbicli it is desirable shall ccniineuce at as early a 
day as practicable, it is propused to iiave co-operative action of all the armies in tlu; iield, as 
far as this object can he accomplislu'd. 

"It will not be ])ossible to unite our armies into two or tliree larg^e on(\s to act as so many 
units, owiiio- to the absolute necessity of holding- en to the territory already taken from the 
enemy, lint, ovnerally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving 
to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. \iy such move- 
ment they interjiose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby 
reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of 
a part of th(> enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and Kichmond l)eing 
the greater ob'?cts towaids which our attention must be directed in the next cam])aign, it is 
desirable to unite all tiie force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington 
with the army of the Potoujac, and of covering your department witli your army, makes it 
impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose, therefore, what 
comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: The army of the Potomac will act 
from its present base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces 
from your command that can be spared trom garrison duty — I should say not less than twenty 
thousand effective men — to operate on the south side of James river, Picdunond being your 
♦ibjective point. To the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from 
8outh Carolina, under JIajor Gemnul Gillmore, who will command them in person. Major 
General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to jon, to command the troojis sent into the tield 
from your own dei)artnient. 

"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress IMonroe, ivith all tlie troops 
on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicablt!. Should you not re- 
ceive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other 
forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made. 

"When vou are notified to move, take Git}' Point with as much force as poBsibie. Fortify 
or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the Iield there as rajjidly as 
you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at tliis time for your fiuther movements. 

" The fact tliat has already been stated — that is, that Kichmond is to beyour objcctivt^ point 
and that tlu^re is to be co-operation between your force and the army of the I'otomac — must 
be your guide. This indicates the neci-ssiiy of your holding close to the south bank of the 
James river as you advance. Tiien, should the enemy be forced into liis intrenchments iu 
Kichmond, the army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two 
armies would become a unit. 

"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. If, however 
you think it ])ractical)le to use your cavalry south of you so as to cut the railroad abt)ut flick's 
ford about the time of the general advance, it wonld he of immense advantage. 

" You will please tbrward for my information, at the earli(>st practicable day, all orders de- 
tails and instructions you may give tor the execution of tiiis order. 

"U. 8. GKANT, Licutrnnnt General. 

" Major General B. F. BuTi.EU." 

On the leth, these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the IDth, in 
order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of General Meade, 
he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort Monroe the same day 



tliat General Meade moved from Culpepcr. The exact time I was to tele- 
graph him as soon as it was fixed, ami that it would not be earlier than the 27th 
of April; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpeper and liich- 
mond if he would stand. Should he, however, fall back into Richmond, I 
would follow up and make a junction with his (General Butler's) army on the 
James river; that, could I be certain he would be able to invest Riclimond on 
the south side so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I 
would form the junction there ; that circumstances might make this course 
advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far 
up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the 
receipt of orders to move ; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least 
detain as large a force as possible. 

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was 
desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from 
the fields of innnediate operations, and also those kept in the background for 
the protection of our extended lines between the loyal States and the armies 
operating against them. 

A very considerable force under command of Major General Sigel was so 
held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland and 
Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields 
without exposing the north to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the 
enemy, they could act directly to their front and give better protection than if 
lying idle in garrison. By such movement they would either compel the enemy 
to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, 
or he would lose them. 

General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into 
two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Gen- 
erals Onl and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad. Sub- 
sequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own request, Greneral Sigel 
was instructed, at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by Beverly 
and to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the Kanawha, number- 
ing about ten thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about 
seven thousand men. The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between Cum- 
berland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar 
creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten 
the enemy in the Shenandoah valley, and advance as far as possible; while 
General Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and 
move down the Tennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroy- 
ing the New river bridge and the salt-works at Saltville, Va. 

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were de- 
layed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness and the roads 
favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later 
than the 4th of ]\Iay. 

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion and capture 
the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General Butler should 
succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would tend more than any- 
thing else, unless it were the capture of Lee's armj^ to accomplish this desired 
result in the east. If he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, 
either to compel Lee to retreat or to so cripple him that he could not detach a 
large force to go north and still retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It 
was well understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting ou 
the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the 
James river, in case of failure to destroy Lee withoui it. 

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort Monroe, 
and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession 
of Petersburg and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible 



6 

Believing-, Lowever, in tlio practicability of capturing Richmond unless it was 
re-enforced, I made that the olijeclive point of bis o])erationj^. As tbe army of 
tbe Potomac Avas to move simultaneous!}' with bira, Lee could not detacb from 
his army Avith safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to 
the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of 
James river. 

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I trii d, as far as 
possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the army of the 
Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through him, and were gen- 
eral in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him. The cam- 
paigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. His 
commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has 
drawn from liim much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle 
him to, and which he would otherwise have received. 

The moA'ement of tbe array of the Potomac commenced early on the morn- 
ing of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of ^iajor Gen- 
eral IMcade, pursuant to instructions. Before night the whole army was across 
the lia})idan, (tbe 5tb and Gtb corps crossing at Germania ford, and the 2d 
corps at United States ford, the cavalry, under Major General JSheridan, moving 
in advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about 4,000 wagons, 
meeting with but sliglit opposition. The average distance travelled by the 
troops that day was about twelve miles. This 1 regarded as a great success, 
and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, 
that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed and 
ably-commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a 
hostile country and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the 5th, 
Major General G. K. Warren connuauding) met and engaged tbe enemy out- 
side bis intrenchments near Mine lUui. Tbe battle raged furiously all day, the 
whole army beir.g brought into the light as fost as the corps could be got upon 
the tield, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the 
roads, was done with conmiendable promptness. 

General Eurnside, with tbe 9th corps, was, at the time the army of the Poto- 
mac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the lvapi)abanuock 
river and Alexandria railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run, with instruc- 
tions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was 
eecured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This 
crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of the 
morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness 
tavern, some of bis troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, 
crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large 
proportion, probably two-thirds of his connnand, was composed of new troops, 
unaccustomed to marches and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was 
a remarkable march. 

The battle of tbe Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morn- 
ing of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each 
army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of 
the 5th. After dark iIk; enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, 
ca])turing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. But 
the promptness of General Sedgwick, who Avas personally present and com- 
manded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. On the 
morning of the 7th reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind 
his inti enched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-lield. 
From this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied 
him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwith- 
standing his advantage of position, and that he Avould Avait an attack behind his 
works. I therefore determiued to push on and put my whole force between him 



aiifl Riclimond ; and oi'dcvs were at once issued for a movement by his right 
flank. On the night of the 7th the march was commenced towards Spottsyl- 
vania Court-House, the 5th corps moving on the most direct road. But the 
enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, 
was enabled to reach there first. On the 8th General Warren met a force of 
the enemy which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain 
time to fortify the line taken ixp at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily 
driven back on the main force, within the recently constructed works, after con- 
siderable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the 
9th General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communica- 
tion with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and 
fighting, without decisive results. Among the killed on the 9th was that able 
and distinguished soldier Major General John Sedgwick, commanding the 6th 
army corps. Major General H. G. Wright succeeded him in command. Early 
on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position. 
The 2d corps. Major General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, 
capturing most of Johnston's division of E well's corps and twenty pieces of ar- 
tillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not 
prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in 
manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of re-enibrcements from Washington. 
Deeming it impracticable to make any farther attack upon the enemy at Spott- 
sylvania Court-House, orders were issued on the 18th with a view to a movement 
to the North Anna, to commence at 12 o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late 
in the afternoon of the 19th Ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme 
right flank ; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. This de- 
layed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the 21st, when it was 
commenced. But the enemy again having the shorter line, and being in pos- 
session of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North Anna in advance of 
us, and took position behind it. The 5th corps reached the North Anna on the 
afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the 6th corps. Tlie 2d and 9th corps 
got up about the same time, the 2d holding the railroad bridge and the 9th 
lying between that and Jericho ford. General Warren effected a drossing the 
game afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon after getting 
into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great 
slaughter. On the 25th General Sheridan rejoined the army of the Potomac 
from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the 
depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies 
of rations, and many miles of railroad track ; recaptured about four hundred of 
our men, on their Avay to Richmond as prisoners of war ; met and defeated the 
enemy's cavalry at Yellow Tavern ; carried the first line of works around 
Richmond, (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault) re- 
crossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow's Bridge, under 
heavy fire, and moved by a detour to Haxall's landing, on the James river, 
where he communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of 
drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, and making it comparatively 
easy to guard our trains. 

General Butler moved his main force up the James river, in pursuance of in- 
structions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him with the 10th 
corps. At the same time he sent a force of 1,800 cavalry, by way of West 
Point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force 
of 3,000 cavalry, under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the 
roads south of Petersburg and Richmond. On the 5th he occupied, without 
opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a 
complete surprise. On the 6th he was in position Avith his main army, and 
commenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the 
Petersburg and Richmond railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. 
On the 9th he telegraphed as follows: 



8 

"IlEADQUARTKnS NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, May 9, 1864, 

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With 1,700 cavalr>- wc have 
advanced up tlie Peninsula, forctnl tlie Cliiekahominy, and liave safely hroug-ht tlnMu to our 
present position. These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets 
towards Richmond. 

"General Kautz with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same day with our 
movement up James river, forced the Blackwati^r, biuiied the railroad bridge at Stony creek, 
below Petersburg, cutting in two Beauregard's forces at tiiat point. 

" We have landed lure, intrcnclied onrsc^lves, destroycil many miles of railroad, and got 
a position which witli ])ro)ier supplies we can hold out against the whole of Lee's army. I 
liave ordered up the suj)plies. 

" Beauregard with a large portion of his force was left south by the cutting of the railroads 
by Kautz. That jjortiim wliich reached Petersburg under Hill I have wliippud to-day, killing 
and wounding many and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested light. 

" General Grant will not be troubled with any fiuther re-enforcements to Lee from Bean- 
regard's force. 

"BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, 

" Major General. 

"Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of JJ'ar." 

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of 
the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling, with small 
loss. The time thus consumed from the Gth lost to us the benefit of the sin-- 
prise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg, enabling-, as it did, Beauregard 
to collect his loose forces in North and South Carolina and bring them to the 
defence of those places. On the 16th the enemy attacked General Butler in 
his position in front of Drury's Bluff, He was forced back, or drew back, into 
his intrenchments between the forks of the James and A})[)omattox rivers, the 
enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, 
and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though in a position of 
great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against 
Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. It required but a com- 
paratively small force of the enemy to hold it there. 

On the 12th Grcneral Kautz Avith his cavalry M-as started on a raid against 
the Danville railroad, -which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chola 
stations, destroying them, the railroad triick, two freight trains, and one loco- 
motive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores ; thence 
crossing to the South Side road, struck it at Wilson's, Wellsville. and Black 
and White stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded 
to City Point, which he reached on tlie ISth. 

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the 
enemy, with a land fierce under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked 
Plymouth, N. C, commanded by General H. W. Wessels, and our gunboats 
there, and after severe fighting the place was carried by assault and the entire 
garrison and armament captured. The gunboat Smithfield was sunk and the 
Miami disabled. 

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed itself 
up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most if not all 
the re-enforcements brought from the south by Beauregard against the army of 
the Potomac. In addition to this re-enforcement, a very considerable one, 
probably not less than 15,000 men, was obtained by calling in the scattered 
troops under Breckinridge from the western part of Virginia. 

The position at Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult 
to operate from against the enemy. I detei'iiiined, therefore, to bring from it all 
available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained, and ac- 
cordingly, on the 22d, 1 directed that they be sinit forward, under command of 
Major General W. F. Smith, to join the army of the Potomac. 

On the 24th of ^lay the !)th army corps, commanded by iMajor General A. E. 
Burnside, was assigned to the army of the Potomac, and from this time forward 
constituted a portion of Major General Meade's command. 



Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of his 
previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 2Gth to the north bank of the 
North Anna, and moved via Hanovertov/n to turn the enemy 'a position by his 
right. 

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan, and 
the 6th corps led the advance ; crossed the Pamunky river at Hanovertown 
after considerable fighting, and on the 2Sth the two divisions of cavahy had a 
severe but successful engagement with the enemy at Haw's shop. On the 29th 
and 30th we advanced, with lieavy skirmishing, to the Ilanovcr Court House and 
Cold Harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the Chicka- 
hominy. Late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked 
our left, but was repulsed Avith very considerable loss. An attack was imme- 
diately ordered by General Meade along his whole line, which resulted in 
driving the enemy from a ])art of his intrenched skirmish line. 

On the 31st General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad 
bridges over the South Anna river, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. Gen- 
eral Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved 
by the Gth corps and General Smith's command, which had just arrived, via 
White House, from General Butler's army. 

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at 5 p. m. by the 6th corps and 
the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in readiness to ad- 
vance on the receipt of orders. This residted in our carrying and holding the 
enemy's iirst line of works in front of the right of the 6th corps and in front of 
General Smith. During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each 
of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but were repulsed with heavy loss 
in every instance. That night he made several assaults to regain what he had 
lost in the day, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for 
an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's 
Avorks, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt our loss 
■was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively 
light. It was the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James 
which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. 
I would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in vic- 
tories to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them; but they 
inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, iu the end, to the complete 
overthrow of the rebellion. 

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was 
impossible by any flank movement to interpose between him and the city. I 
was still in a condition to either move by his left flank and invest Richmond 
from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of 
the James. While the former might have been better as a covering for Wash- 
ington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be imprac- 
ticable to hold a line north and east of Richmond that would protect the Fred- 
ericksburg railroad — a long, vulnerable line, which v>'ould exhaust much of our 
strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and 
would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side 
of the James. My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north of 
Richmond if possible. Then, after destroying his lines of communication north 
of the James river, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in 
Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. After the battle of the 
Wilderness it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to 
run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive be- 
hind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and 
where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater 
sacrifice of life than 1 was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I 
had desijrned north of Richmond. I therefore determined to continue to hold 



10 

substantially the groimd we then occupietl, taking; advantage of any favorable 
circnmstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to 
Charlottesville and Gordonsville, to eftectually break up the railroad connexion 
between Iviohmond and the Shenandoah valley and Lynchburg; and, when the 
cavalry got Avell off, to move the army to the south side of the James river, by 
the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply 
except by the canal. 

On the 7 til two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on the 
expedition against the Virginia Central railroad, with instructions to Hunter, 
whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan's, 
and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the army of 
the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions. 

On the lOth of June General Butler sent a force of infantry under General 
Gillmore, and cavalry under General Kautz, to capture Petersburg if possible, 
and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the Appomattox. The cav- 
alry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the 
town, but were forced to retire. General Gillmore finding the works which he 
approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Ber- 
muda Hundred without attempting one. 

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back to 
Bermuda Hundred and City Point General Smith's command by water, via the 
White House, to reach there in advance of the army of the Potomac. This 
was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming 
aware of our intention, could re-enforce the place. 

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 
12th; one division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the 5th corps crossed 
the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak swamp, to 
cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corps reached Jaines river, 
at Wilcox's landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of the 13th. 

During three long years the armies of the Potomac and northern Virginia had 
been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more desperate bat- 
tles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without 
materially changing the vantage-ground of either. The southern press and peo- 
ple, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the north, finding that they 
had failed to capture Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted 
they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and southern ter- 
ritory. Hence, Antietam, (Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been 
fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them. 
Their army believed this. It produced a morale Avhich could only be overcome 
by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of the Wilderness, 
Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were 
on our side, weie even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to 
make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. His losses in men were probably 
not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost in- 
variably the attacking party; and when he did attack it was in the open field. 
The details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the 
soldiery have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of Major General 
Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it. 

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to James river, 
the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting l)ase, by wagons, over narrow 
roads, through a densely Avooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new 
base from wliich to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot, 
therefore, l)e aAvardcd to the quartermaster and commissary departments for 
the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under the general supervision of 
the chit.'f quartermaster, Brigadier General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to 



11 

occupy all the available roads between the array and our water base, and but 
little difficulty was experienced in protecting them. 

The movement of the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General 
Sigel, commenced on the first of May. General Crook, who had the immediate 
command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving 
one, composed of cavalry, to General Averill. They crossed the mountains by 
separate routes. Averill struck the Tennessee and Virginia railroad, near 
Wyth<ville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New river and Christiansburg, de- 
stroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including New river 
bridge, forming a junction with Crook at Union on the 15th. General Sigel 
moved up the Shenandoah valley, met the enemy at New Market on the 15th, 
and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind 
Cedar creek. Not regarding the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I 
asked his removal from command, and Major General Hunter was appointed to 
supersede him. His instructions were embraced in the following despatches to 
Major General II. W. Ilalleck, chief of staff of the army : 

"Near Spottsylvania Court House, Va., May 20, 18G4. 

"The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly ou such as are brought over the 
branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think it would be better 
for General Hunter to move m that direction ; reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottes- 
ville, if he does not meet too much opposition. If ho can hold at bay a force equal to his 
own, he will be doing good service. # * # 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General. 

"Major General H. W. Halleck." 

"Jericho Ford, Va., May 25, 1864. 

"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so, living on 
the country. The railroads and canal should Ije destrt)yed beyond possibility of repairs for 
weeks. Completing this, he could tind his way back to his original base, or from about 
Gordonsville join this army. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General. 

"Major General H. W. Halleck." 

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and moving up the She- 
nandoah vaHcy, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and after a 
battle of ten hours routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle 
1,500 men, 3 pieces of artillery, and 300 stand of small-arms. On the Sth of 
the same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averill at Staunton, 
from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place 
he reached and invested o\\ the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was very 
succesh^ful, and but for the difficulty uf taking with him sufiicient ordnance 
stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would no doubt have 
captured that (to the enemy,) important point. The destruction of the enemy's 
supplies and manufactories was very great. To meet this movement under 
General Hiuiter, General Lee sent a force, perliaps equal to a corps, a part of 
which reached Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing 
on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give 
battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want of amumnitiou 
left him no choice of route for his return but by way of Kanawha. This lost 
to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the north. 

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of Lexington, 
as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have 
covered the Shenandoah valley against the enemy, should the force he met have 
seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he v/ould have been within easy distance 
of the James river canal, on the main line of communication between Lynch- 
burg and the force sent for its defence. I have never taken exception to the 
operations of General Hunter, and I am not now disposed to find fault with 
him, for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of 



12 

Lis iiLstructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude of his move 
ments and his galhnntry should entitle him to the commendation of his country. 

To return to the army of the Potomac : The 2d corps commenced crossing 
the James river ou the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox's landing. 
The laying of tlie pontoon bridge was com|)leted about midnight of the 14th, 
and the crossing of the remainder of the army was rapidly pushed forward by 
both bridge and ferry. 

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by a steamer to P>('rmuda 
Hundred to give the necessary orders for tlie immediate capture of Petersburg. 

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send 
General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troo})s he could give him 
without sacriticing tin; position he then held. I told him that I would return at 
once to the army of the I'otomac, hasten its crossing, and throAv it forward to 
Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done ; that we could re-enforce 
our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. 
General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near 
Petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason, tliat I have 
never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his 
main lines until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he 
made the assault, and carried the lines northeast of Petersburg from the Appo- 
mattox river, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces 
of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about 7 p. m. Between 
the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no other works, aiid there 
was no evidence that the enemy had re-enforced Petersburg with a single brigade 
from any source. The night was clear — the moon shining brightly — and favor- 
able to farther operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d 
corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these 
troops as he (Smith) nn'ght wish, waiving rank to the named comm;\nder, who he 
naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the 
troo[)s. But instead of taking these ti'oops, and pushing at once into Peters- 
burg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured 
■works, which was done before midnight. 

By the time I arrived tlic next morning the enemy was in force. An attack 
was ordered to be made at 6 o'clock that evening by the troops under Smith 
and the 2d and 9th corps. It required until that time for the 9th corps to get 
up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting con- 
tinued with but little intermission until 6 o'clock the next morning, and resulted 
in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the 
right (our left) of those previously captured by General Suiith, several pieces 
of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners. 

The 5th corps having got up, th(! attacks were renewed and persisted in with 
great vigor on the 17th and l^tli, but oidy resulted in forcing the enemy to an 
interior line from which he could not be dislodged. The advantages in position 
gained by us were very great. The army then proceeded to envelop Peters- 
biug toward the Southside railroad, as far as possible, without attacking forti- 
fications. 

On the 6th the enemy, to re-enforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of his 
intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting no doubt to get troops 
from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn before we could 
discover it. General Butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force 
on the railroad between Petersburg and Kichmond. As soon as I was apprised 
of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions of the 6th 
corps. General Wright commanding, that were embarking at Wilcox's landing, 
under orders for City Point, to report to General Butler, at Bermuda Ihmdred 
of which General Buth^r was notilicd, and the importance of holding a position 
in advance of his present line urged upon him. 



13 

Aboiit 2 o'clock in tlie afternoon General Butler was forced back to the line 
the enemy liad withdrawn from iu the morning. General Wright, with his two 
divi.'^ions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still 
holding with a strong picket line the enemy's works. But instead of putting 
these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt 
and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. Between 4 and o o'clock in 
the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and reoccupied his 
old line. 

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected 
by General Butler, Avitli one brigade of inffintry, on the north bank of the 
James, at Deep Bottom, and connected the pontoon bridge with Bermuda 
Hundred. 

On the 19th General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the 
Virginia Central railroad, arrived at the White House just as the enemy's cav- 
alry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. The result of this expe- 
dition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near Trevillian 
Station on the morning of the llth of June, whom he attacked, and after an ob- 
stinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. He left his dead and 
nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and 
several hundred horses. On the 12th he destroyed the raih'oad from Trevillian 
Station to Louisa Court House. This occupied until 3 o'clock p. m., when he 
advanced in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy re-enforced by 
infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter 
place, and too strong to successfully assault. On the extreme right, however, 
his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and was twice driven there- 
from by inflmtry. Night closed the contest. Not having sufficient ammunition 
to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage, (tlie country 
furnishing but inferior grazing,) and hearing nothing from General Hunter, he 
withdrew his command to the north side of the North Anna, and commenced his 
return march, reaching White House at the time before stated. After breaking 
\\p the depot at that place he moved to the James river, which he reached safely 
after heavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Pow- 
hatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the army of the Potomac. 

On the 22d General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the army of 
the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavahy of the army of the 
James, moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond. Striking the 
Weldon railroad at Ream's Station, destroying the depot and several miles of 
the road and the Southside road about fifteen miles from Petersburg, to near 
Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry, 
he reached Burksville Station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there 
destroyed the Danville railroad to Roanoke bridge, a distance of twenty-five 
miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he 
could not dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 
28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon railroad crossing of Stony 
creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence he made a 
detour from his left, with a view of reaching Ream's Station, (supposing it to 
be in our possession.) At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, sup- 
ported by infimtry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains. 
In this last encounter General Kautz, with a part of his command, became 
separated, and made his way into our lines. General Wilson, with the 
remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway river and coming 
in safely on our left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition 
more than compensated for the losses Ave sustained. It severed all connexion 
by railroad with Richmond for several weeks. 

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the 
Anna rivers and making him wary of the situation of his array in the Shenaa- 



14 

doali, and, in the event of failure in tins, to take advantage of his necessary 
withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared 
in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the 
night of the 2Gth of July the 2d corps and two divisions of the cavalry corpg 
and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the James river and 
joined the force General Buthsr had there. On the 27th the enemy was driven 
from his intrenched position, Avith the h.ss of four pieces of artillery. On the 
28th our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market road, but in 
getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting 
lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. Tlie first 
object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown 
there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by 
assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force back there. One division of 
the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the 
night to the rear of the ISth corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it 
might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. The other two divisions of the 
2d corps and Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th 
and moved in front of I'eteisburg. On the morning of the 30th, betM'een four 
and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a 
regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps, 
immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line 
for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, 
but for some cause ftiiled to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they 
done this, I have every reason to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. 
Other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in get- 
ting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been 
comjdete) and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured line thus 
held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, 
but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what promised to be 
the most successful assault of the campaign. 

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was retreat- 
ing from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha river, thus laying the Shenandoah 
valley open for raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he returned northward, 
and moved down that valley. As soon as this movement of the enemy was as- 
certained, General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha river, Avas directed 
to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but 
owing to the difiiculty of navigation by reason of low water and brealvs in the 
railioad, great delay Avas experienced in getting there. It became necessary, 
therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this 
j)urpose the Gth corps was taken from the armies operating against Richmond, 
to which was added the 19th corps, tlien fortunately beginning to arrive in 
Hampton roads from the Gulf department, under orders issued immediately after 
the ascertainment of the result of the Red River expedition. The garrisons of 
Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up of heavy artillery regi- 
ments, hundred-days men, and detachments from the invalid corps. One divi- 
sion under command of General Rickctts, of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, 
and the remaining two divisions of the Gth corps, under General Wright, were 
subsequently sent to Washington. On the 3il of July the enemy approached 
Blartinsburg; General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated 
across the J^otomac at Shepardstown; and General Weber, commanding at 
Harjxn-'s Ferry, crossed the river and occupied ^laryland heights. On the 6th 
the enemy occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards Frederick 
city. General Wallace with Ricketts's division and his own command, the latter 
mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from Baltimore with great 
promjttness, and met the enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of 
the railroad bridge. His force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fou'rht 



15 

the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it 
detained the enemy and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach 
AVashington with two divisions of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th 
corps, before him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry 
advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th a recon- 
uoissance was thrown out in front of Fort lirtevens, to ascertain the enemy's posi- 
tion and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about 280 in killed 
and wounded. The enemy's loss was probably greater. He commence 1 re- 
treating during the night. Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washing- 
ton, I requested by telegraph, at 11.45 p. m. on the 12th, the assignment of 
Major General H. G.Wright to the command of all the troops that could be made 
avaihible to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should 
get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push Early to the 
last moment. General Wright commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th 
the enemy Avas overtaken at Snicker's ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp 
skirmish occurred ; and on the 20th General Averill encountered and defeated 
a portion of the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and 
several hundred prisoners. 

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond, 
I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies operating against 
Richmond, so tliat they might be used in a movement against Lee before the 
return of the troops sent by him into the valley; and that Hunter should remain 
in the Shenandoah valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and Wash- 
ington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. I felt that if the enemy 
had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th 
corps could leave Washington. Subsequently the 19th corps was excepted from 
the order to return to the James. 

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon 
Maryland and Pennsylv?nia, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, was ordered 
back to the vicinity of Haiper's Ferry. The rebel force moved down the valley, 
and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania, which on the 30th burned Cham- 
bersburg and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards Cumberland. 
They were met and defeated by General Kelly, and with diminished numbers 
escaped into the mountains of West Virginia. From the time of the first raid 
the telegraph wires Avere frequently down between Washington and City Point, 
making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. It took 
from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get despatches through and return an- 
swers back; so that often orders would be gi^'en, and then information would be 
received showing a different state of flicts from those on which they were based, 
causing a confusion and apparent contradiction of orders tliat must have consid- 
erably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations 
against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. To remedy 
this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme 
command of all the forces in the departments of West Virginia, Washington, 
Susquehanna and the middle department, and I so recommended. 

On the 2d of August I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to Major 
General Llalleck, chief of staff", at Washington, with a view to his assignment 
to the command of all the forces against Early. At this time the enemy was 
concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, whilst our forces, under General 
LIunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of the Baltimore 
and Ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy western Maryland and southern 
Pennsylvania. From Avliere I was, I hesitated to give positive orders for the 
movement of our forces at Monocacy, lest by so douig I should expose Wash- 
ington. Therefore, on the 4th I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and 
determine for myself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and after con- 
sultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following instructions: 



16 

'•MoxocArv Bridge, Md., 

" August ;"), 18(i4 — 8 p. ni. 

"GexkRAL". Concmtratc all your availahlo force wiflioiit delay in tlie vicinity of Harper's 
Ferry, leaviiiji; only such railroad puards and o;nrrisons for jmlilic property as may be neces- 
sary. Use, in tins coneentratintr, the railroads, if by so doinji' time can be saved From 
Harper's Ferry, if it is iound that the enemy has movi'd north of the Potomac in large force, 
pnsli north, ft)ll(nvin^ liiin and attacking him wherever found ; follow him if driven south of 
the I'otomac, as longas it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has Init a small 
force north of the I'otomuc, then )iush south with the main force, detaching under a com- 
petent connnamler a sullicient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their humcs. 
In detaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en route fnun Washington via IJock 
ville may be taken into account. 

"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, nttm- 
bcrhig, at legist, 5,000 men and horses. Those will be instructed, in the absence of further 
ordei'S, to jtiin yon by the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will ])rolmbly start to- 
nioiTow. In pushing up the SlK'nandoah ^•e.lley, \\h<'re it is expecti'd you will have to go 
first or last, it is dcsinibli! that nothing should he left to invitee the enemy to return. 'J'ake 
all ])rovisioiis, forage, and stock wanti^d for the use of your coumiand ; such as cannot be 
consumed, dvstroy. It is not desimble that the buildings should be destroyed — they should 
mther be protected — but the jK'opie should be informed that so long as an army can subsist 
among tliem recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them 
at all lia/.arils. 

'• Bear in uiind the object is to dviA'o tlie enemy south, and to do thisyoii want to keeji him 
always in sight. Be guided in yoiw course liy the cotnse he takes. 

"Make j-our own arrangements for supj^lies of all kinds, giving regu.lar vouchers for such 
as maj- be taken from loyal citizens in the country thrt)ugh which you march. 

" U. S. GliANT, lAcutenant Gcmrnl. 

" JIajor General D. IIUXTER." 

The troops were immediately pttt in motion, and the advance reached 1 Tall- 
town that nif^ht. 

General Hnnter having, in our conversation, expressed a Avillingness to be 
relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then at Wash- 
ington, sent to llarju-r's Ferry l>y the morning train, with orders to take gene- 
ral command of all the troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at 
Jlonocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. I remained 
at j\[onocacy, until Gener;d Sheridan arrived, on the morning of the Gth, and, 
after a conference with him in relation to military aftairs in that vicinity, I re- 
turned to City Point by way of Washington. 

Ou the 7th of August the middle department and the deparfracmts of West 
Virginia, Washington, and Sns(juehanna were constituted into the "Middle 
militaiy division," and ^lajur (nnieral Sheridan was assigned to temporary 
command of the same. 

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were 
sent to Sheridan from the army of the Potomac. The tirst reached him at 
Harper's Perry about the 11th of August. 

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September 
were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe 
jskinaishei?, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally success!ul, 
but no general engagement took place. The two armies lay in such a })()sition 
— the enetny on the west bank of the Opequau creek covering Winchester, 
and our forces in front of Bcriysville — that either could bring on a battle at 
any time. Defeat to us Avould lay open to the enemy the States of JMaiyland 
and Pcinisylvania for long distances before another army could Ix; interposed 
to check hiui. Under these circumstances, I hesitated about allowing tlu^ initia- 
tive to be taken. Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the 
Chesapeake and Ohio canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became 
so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving Pennsylvania 
and Maiyland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that 1 determined 
the risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for an attack 
wiihout knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's feelings as to Mhat 



17 

would be tlie probable result, I lel't City Point on the 15tli of September to 
visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should 
be done. I met him at Charleston, and he pointed out so distinctly how each 
army lay; what he coidd do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such 
confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of instructions 
necessary — Go in ! For the convenience of forage, the teams for supplying the 
army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him if he could get out his teams 
and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing Tuesday morning. His 
reply was, that he could bctbre daylight on Monday. He was oft promptly to 
time, and I may here add that the; result was such, that I have never since 
deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders. 

Early on the morning of the 19th General Sheridan attacked General Early 
at the crossing on the Opequan creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody 
battle, lasting until 5 o'clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, 
carrying his entire position from Opequan creek to Winchester, capturing several 
thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. T'he enemy rallied and made a 
stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked and again de- 
feated with heavy loss on the 20th. Sheridan pursued him with great energy 
through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue llidge. After strip- 
ping the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, 
he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of Cedar creek. 
Having received considerable re-enforcements. General Early again returned 
to the valley, and on the 9th of October his cavalry encountered ours near 
Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated with the loss of eleven pieces of artil- 
lery and 350 prisoners. On the night of the 18th the enemy crossed the moun- 
tains Avhich .separated the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the north fork, 
and early on the morning of the 19tli, under cover of the darkness and the fog, 
surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our 
whole line. Oar troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but 
were finally rallied between Middletown and Newtown. At this juncture 
General Sheridan, who was at Winchester when the battle commenced, arrived 
on the field, arranged his lines ji;st in time to repulse a heavy attack of the en- 
emy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great 
vigor. The enemy was defeated with great slaughter and the loss of most of 
his artillery and trains and the trophies ho had captured in the morning. The 
wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staun- 
ton and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, 
the enemy's last attempt to invade the north via the Shenandoah valley. I was 
now enabled to return the 6th corps to the army of the Potomac, and to send 
one division from Sheridan's army to the army of the James, and another to 
Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and 
thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose. 

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached 
three divisions from Petersburg to re-enforce Early in the Shenandoah valley. 
I therefore sent the 2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, of the army 
of the Potomac, and a force of General Butler's army, on the night of the 13th 
of August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James, to prevent 
him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. In this 
move Ave captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained 
troops that Avere under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division, 
(Kershaw's) of the three reputed detached, had gone. 

The enemy having AvithdraAvn heavily from Petersburg to resist this move- 
ment, the 5th corps. General Warren commanding, Avas moved out on the 18th 
and took possession of the Weldon railroad. During the day he had consid- 
erable fighting. To regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated 
and desperate assaults, but Avas each time repulsed with great loss. On the- 
5> 



18 

night of the i^Otli tlie troops on the iiuith ^ide of the James were -withclrawn, 
and Hancock and Gregg; returned to the front of Petersburg. On the 25th the 
2d corps and Gregg's division of cavahy, Avhile at Ream's Station destroying 
the raih-oad, were attacked, and after desperate figliting, a part of our line gave 
way, and live pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. 

By the 12th of September a branch railroad was completed from the City 
Point and Petersburg railroad to the Weldon railroad, enabling us to supply, 
without difficulty, in all Aveather, the army in front of Petersburg. 

The extension of our lines across the Weldon railroad compelled the enemy 
to so extend his that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the 
James for the defence of Richmond. On the night of the 2Stli the ]Oth corps. 
Major General Hirney, and the ISth corps, IMajor General Ord commanding, of 
General P)ulter's army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and ad- 
vanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and 
intrenchments below Chapin's farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen 
pieces of artillery and the Xew 3Iarket road and intrenchments. This success 
was folloAved up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gillmore, immediately in front 
of the Chapin farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. 
Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported 
by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further. 
The position captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond that I 
determined to hold it. The enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge 
us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. On the 
morning of the 30th General Meade sent out a reconnoissance, with a view to 
attacking the enemy's line if it Avas found sufficiently Aveakened by Avithdrawal 
of troops to the north side. In this reconnoissance Ave captured and held the 
enemy's Avorks near Poplar Spring church. In the afternoon troops moA'ing to 
get to the left of the point gained Avere attacked by the enemy in heavy force, 
and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured 
Avorks. Our cavalry under Gregg Avas also attacked, but repulsed tin; enemy 
Avith great loss. 

On the 7th of October the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of the 
James, and drove it back with heaAy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, and 
the loss of all the artillery — eight or nine pieces. This he folloAved Tip by an 
attack on our intrenched infantry line, but Avas repulsed Avith seA'ere slaughter. 
On the 13th a reconnoissance Avas sent out by General Butler, Avith a vicAv to 
drive the enemy from some iiom- Avorks he Avas constructing, Avhich resulted in 
very heavy loss to us. 

On the 27tli the army of the Potomac, leaving only suiiicient men to hold its 
fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The 2d corj)s,folloAved by tAvo 
divisions of the 5th corps, Avith the cavalry in advance and covering our left 
flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's run, and moved up the south side of it 
toAvards the South Side railroad, until the 2d corps and part of the cavalry 
reached tlie Boydton plank road, Avhere it crosses Hatcher's run. At this point 
we Avere six miles distant from the South Side railroad, Avhich I had hoped by 
this moA'ement to reach and hold. lUit finding that Ave had not reached the 
end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful 
assault by Avhich Ik; might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to Avith- 
draw to Avithin our fortified line. ( )r(lers AveregiA'cn accordingly. Innnediately 
upon receiving a report that (ieiural Warren had connected Avith General 
Hancock, I returned to my head(|uarters. Soon after I left, the enemy moA'ed 
out across Hatcher's run, in the gii[) between Generals Hancock and Warren, 
Avhich Avas not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on General 
Hancock's right and rear, (general Hancock immediately fiiced his corps to 
meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy Avithiu hisAvorks, and Avith- 
drcAV that night to his old position. 



10 

In r^uijport of this laovemcnt General lUitler made a demnnstration on tlie 
north t?ide of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsburg road, 
and also on the York River railroad. In the former he was imsnccessful; in 
the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, 
and his forces withdrawn to their former positions. 

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and Iiichmoud, 
until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defence and exten- 
sion of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of 
communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send 
south. By the 7 th of February our lines were extended to Hatcher's run, and 
the Weldon railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford. 

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the Gth of May, with the armies 
of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded, respectively, by Generals 
Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army at Dalton ; but finding 
the enemy's positions atBuzzard Roost, coveringDalton, too strongtobe assaulted. 
General JMcPherson was sent through Snake Gap to turn it, whilst Generals 
Thomas and Schofield threatened it in front and on the north. This movement 
was successful. Johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut oft', fell back to his 
fortified position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th. 
A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy retreated south. Late 
on the 17th his rear guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and heavy skir- 
mishing followed. The next morning, however, he had again disappeared. He 
was vigorously pursued and was overtaken at Cassville on the 19th, but, dur- 
ing the ensuing night, retreated across the Etowah. Whilst these operations 
were going on. General Jeft'erson C. Davis's division of Thomas's army was 
sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts and artillery and its valuable mills and 
foundries. General Sherman having given his army a few days' rest at this 
point, again put it in motion on the 23d for Dallas, with a view of turning the 
difficult pass at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th the advance, under 
General Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New 
Hope church, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point. 
The most important was on the 2Sth, when the enemy assaulted General Mc- 
Pherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse. 

On the 4th of June Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at New 
Hope churcli and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost 
mountains. He was forced to yield the two last named places and concentrate 
his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and McPherson 
made a determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of the 2d of July 
Sherman commenced moving his army by the right fiank, and on the morning 
of the od found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had aban- 
doned Kenesaw and retreated across the Chattahoochie. 

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochie to give his men rest and 
get up stores until the 17th of July, Avhen he resumed his operations, crossed 
the Chattahoochie, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to Augusta, and 
drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded 
General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the oftensive- 
defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman in the vicinity of 
Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of Avhich was on the 22d of July. 
About 1 p. m. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPher- 
son was killed. General Logan succeeded him, and commanded the army of 
the Tennessee through this desjierate battle, and until he was superseded by 
Major General Howard, on the 2Gth, Avith the same success and ability that had 
characterized him in the command of a corps or division. 

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed witli great loss. Finding it im- 
possible to entirely'invest the place. General Sherman, after securing his line of 
communications across the Chattahoochie, moved his main force round by the 



20 

enemy's left ilank upon the ^ilontgomery and Macon njadr^, to draw the enemy 
i'roni his Ibrtitications. In this he succeeded, and, after defeating the enemy 
near Hough and Ready, Jonesboro', and Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to 
the soutli, on the 2d of September occupied Athmta, the objective point of his 
campaign. 

About the time of this move the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attempted to 
out his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton and driven into 
East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro', and 
Franklin, and was finally driven south of the Tennessee. The damage done 
by this raid was repaired in a few days. 

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General llousseau joined General 
Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made a successful raid 
upon the Atlanta and Montgomery railroad, and its branches near Opelika. 
Cavalry raids Avere also made by Generals McCook, Garrard and Stoneman 
to cut the remaining railroad connnunication with Atlanta. The first two were 
successful — the latter disastrous. 

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was jirompt, 
skilful and brilliant. The history of his flank movements and battles during 
that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by 
anything in history. 

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders accompanying it, 
give the details of that most successful campaign. 

He Avas dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad 
from Nashville to the point where he was operating. This passed the entire 
distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by 
troops. The cavalry force of the enemy under Forrest, in northern Mississipj)i, 
was evidently waiting for Slierman to advance far enough into the mountains of 
Georgia to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon his line and destroy it beyond 
the possibility of further use. To guard against this danger Sherman left what 
he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in West Teinies- 
see. He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier 
General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him. On the morn- 
ing of the lOth of June General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown, Mis- 
sissippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to 
Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy. 
By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon Sherman's line of 
communications. The persistency with which he followed up this success 
exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. In the 
mean time Major General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the army of the 
Tennessee that had been sent by General Sherman to General Banks, arrived 
at Memphis on their return from Red river, where they had done most excel- 
lent service. He was directed by General Sherman to immediately take the 
oft'ensive against Forrest. This he did with the promptness and effect Avhich 
has characterized his whole military career. On the 14th of July he met the 
enemy at Tupelo, IMississippi, and whipped him badly. The fighting continued 
through three days. Our loss was small compared Avith tliat of the enemy. 
Having accomplished the (dject of his expedition, General Smith returned to 
Memphis. 

During the months of March and April this same force under Forrest annoyed 
us considerably. On the 24tli of March it captured Union City, Kentucky, 
and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked I'aducah, commanded by Colonel S. 
G. Hicke, 40th Illinois volunteers. Colonel H., having but a small force, 
AvithdreAV to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and 
drove him from the place. 

On the 13th of April, part of this force, undi'r the rebel General Buford, 
summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, but received foi 



21 

reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34t.li New Jersey volunteers, that, being- placed 
there by his government with adequate force "to hold his post and repel all 
enemies from it, surrender was out of the question. 

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee, 
garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry, and the 1st regiment Ala- 
bama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. The garrison fought bravely 
until about 3 o'clock in the afternoon," when the enemy carried the works by 
assault ; and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman 
and merciless massacre of the garrison. 

On the i4th. General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before 
I'aducah, but was again driven off. 

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's operations, were 
also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these was Morgan. With a 
force of from two to three thousand cavalry he entered the State through Pound 
Gap in the latter part of May. On the 11th of June he attacked and captured 
Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12th he was overtaken by General 
Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out 
of the State. This notorious guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near 
Greenville, Tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by General 

Gillem. T> 1 T>- 

In the absence of official reports at the commencement of the Red Kiver 
expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by 
General Sherman under A. J. Smith, I am unable to give the datp of its start- 
ing. The troops under General Smith, comprising two divisions of the 16tli and 
a detachment of the 17th army corps, left Vicksburg on the 10th of INIarch 
and reached the designated point on Red river one day earlier than that 
appointed bv General Banks. The rebel forces at Fort De Russey, thinking 
to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open field ; but, 
Avhile occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations. Smith pushed 
forward to Fort De Russey, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured 
it with its garrison— about 350 men, 11 pieces of artillery, and many small-arms. 
Our loss was but slight. On the loth he pushed forward to Alexandria, 
which place he reached on the ISth. On the 21st he had an engagement with 
the enemy at Henderson llill,in whicdi he defeated him, capturing 210 prisoners 
and 4 pieces of artillery. i i .i 

On the 2Sth he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel General 
Taylor at Cane river. By the 26th General Banks had assembled his whole 
army at Alexandria and pushed forward to Grand Ecore. On the morning ot 
April 6 he moved from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the 7th his advance 
engaged the enemy near Pleasant Hill and drove him from the field. On the 
same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond Pleasant Hill, but 
was again compelled to retreat. On tlie 8th, at Sabine Cross-roads and Peach 
Hill, "the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of 
artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. During the night 
General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on 
the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. During the night General 
Banks continued his retr<. grade movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to Alex- 
andria, which he reached on the 27lh of April. Here a serious difficulty arose 
in getting Admiral Porter's fleet, which accompanied the expedition, over the 
rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their 
return. At the suggestion of Colonel (now Brigadier General) Bailey, and under 
his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was 
contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety. 

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of :\ray, after considerabk' skir- 
mishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and I'oint Coupee 
near the end of the month. The disastrous termination of this expedition, and 



22 

ihc lateness of the season rondeicd impracticable the carrying <mt of my plans 
of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of Mobile. 

On the 23d of March IMajor General Steele left Little Hock with the 7th 
army corps to co-operate Avitli General Banks's expedition on Hed river, and 
reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 16th of April, after driving; the enemy 
before him, he was joined near Elkin's ferry, in Washita county, by General 
Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith. After several severe skirmishes, 
in which the enemy was defeated, General Steele reached Camden, which he 
occupied about the middle of x\pril. 

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Re 1 ri\-er. 
and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's mill, in Dallas county. General 
Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas river. He left Camden on the 
26tli of April, and reached Little Bock on the 2d of May. On the 30th ot xVpril 
the enemy attacked him while crossing Saline ri^■er at Jenkins's ferry, but was 
repulsed with considerable loss. Our loss Avas about 600 in killed, wcnnided. 
and prisoners. 

3Injor General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the "mili- 
tary division of west Mississippi," w^as therefore directed to send the i9th 
army corps to join the armies operating against Richmond, and to limit the re- 
mainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the 
positions and lines of communications he then occupied. 

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, General Canby 
sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the 
Mississippi river. General Smith met and defeated this force near Lake Chicot 
on the 5th of June. Our loss was about 40 killed and 70 wounded. 

In the latter part of July General Canby sent 3Lijor General Gordon Granger, 
with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with Admiral Farragut against 
the defences of Mobile bay. On the Sth of August Fort Gaines surrendered to 
the combined naval and land forces. Fort Powell was bloAvu up and abandoned. 

On the 9th Fort Morgan was invested, and after a severe bombardment sur- 
rendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted to 1,464 prisoners and 104 
pieces of artillery. 

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General Price, with 
a force of about 10,000 men, had reached Jacksonport, on his Av.ay to invade 
Missouri, General A. J, Smith's command, then en route from Memphis to join 
Slierman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same time, 
sent from ]\Iemphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This made General 
Rosecrans's forces superior to those of Price, and no doubt was entertained he 
would be able to check Price and drive him back, while the forces under General 
Steele, in Arkansas, Avould cut off' his retreat. On the 26th day of September 
Price attacked Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved 
north to the Missouri river, and continued up that river towards Kansas. General 
Curtis, commanding department of Kansas, immediately collected such forces as 
he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while (icneral Rosecrans's cavalry was 
operating in his rear. 

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with the loss 
of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners. He made 
a precipitate retreat to northern Arkansas. The impunity with which Price 
was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incal- 
culable mischief done by him, shows to how little purpose a superior force may 
be used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have concen- 
trated his forces and beaten and dri\en Price before the latter reached I'ilot 
Knob. 

September 20 the enemy's cavalry, luider Forrest, crossed the Tennessee 
near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at Athens, con- 
sisting of six hundred men, which c.ipitulated on the 24tl!. Soon after the 



■23 

surrender, two regiments of re-enforcements arrived, and after a severe hgnt were 
compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the 
garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on 
the 27th, and on the same day out the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad near 
Tullahoma and Dechard. On the morning of the 30th one column of Forrest's 
command, under liuford, appeared before Iluntsville, and summoned the sur- 
render of the garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in 
the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its sur- 
render, and received the same reply as on tlie night before. He withdrew in 
the direction of Athens, which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on 
the afternoon of the 1st of October, bat without success. On the morning of 
the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed. 

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of 
the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the 3d he moved 
towards Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on every exertion 
was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he 
could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to Corinth, 
Mississippi. 

In September an expedition under Ceneral Burbridge was sent to destroy 
the salt-works at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d of October, 
about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into his strongly 
intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dis- 
lodge him. During the night he withdrew his command and returned to 
Kentucky. 

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies in 
camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and 
supplying them for future service. The great length of road f"om Atlanta to 
the Cumberland river, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but 
little rest. 

During this time Jefterson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which 
was reported in the papers of the south, and soon became known to the Avhole 
country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to 
fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that 
had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive 
could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often 
defeated it. 

In execution of this plan, Hood, with his army, was soon reported to the 
southwest of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching 
the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it. 

General Sherman leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with_the remainder of his 
army fell upon him and drove him to Gadston, Alabama. Seeing the constant 
annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if we attempted to hold 
Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that 
place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows : 

" Cextreville, Ga., October lU— noon. 
"Despatch about Wilson just leceiveil. Hood is now crossing Coosa river, 12 miles below 
Rome, bound west. If lie piisse.s over the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the 
plan of my letter sent liy Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas, with the troops now in 
fennessee, to defend the State? He will have an ample force when the re-enforcements 
ordered reach Nashville. 

"W. T. SHEiniAX, Major General. 

"Lieut. Gen. Grant." 

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this despatch, I quote from 
the letter sent by Colonel Porter : " I will therefore give my opinion, that your 
army and Cauby's should be re-enforced to the maximum ; that, after you get 
Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed 



24 

to hold the Mississippi river, and i^ond a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either 
by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood em- 
ployed and put my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and 
Charleston, to be ready ai^ soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce, and 
the city of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of 
mine of date September 12, in answer to a despatch of his containing substantially 
the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a proposed movement 
against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia, &c. 

"CiTV Point, Va., October l^, 18(54—11 a. in. 

" Yoiu' clc'sp.iti-li of October 10 n.'ccivcd. Does it not look us if Hood was c:oinp: to attempt 
tbe iuvasioii of ^Middle Tenucssoo, using' the Mobile and Ohio aud Memphis and Charleston 
roads to supply his base on the Tennessee river, about Florence or Decatur ? If he does this 
he ought to be met aud ])reveuted from gettinj^ north of the Tennessee river. If you were 
to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by 
all the old men, little boys, and such railroad giiards as arc still left at home. Hood would 
probably strike for Nashville, thinking that b^^ going north he could inflict greater damage 
upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at 
Hood's army I would prefer that ; but I must trust to your own judgment. I iind I shall 
not be able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, there- 
fore, will be independent of mine ; at least until the fall of Kichmond takes place. I am 
afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to jtrotect, could not prevent Hood from 
going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put 
nuich more on the defensive than heretofore. 

"17. .S. GKAXT, Lieut. General. 

"Maj. Gen. W. T. Shf.rmax." 

"Kixc;sTON, Ga., October II — 11 a. m. 

"Hood moved his army from I'almetto Station across by Dallas and Cedartown, and is 
now on the Coosa river, south of Rome. He threw one corjis on my road at Acworth, and 
I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta ^vitll the 2(lth corjis, and have strong detachments 
along my line. This reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot 
remain here on the defensive. With the 2.5,000 men, aud the bold cavalry he has, he can 
constantly break my roads. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of 
the countiy from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter cily — send hack all my wounded 
and worthless, aud, with my effective army, move through Georgia, smasliing things, to the 
sea. Hood may tiu'u into Tenness(H' and Kentucky, Ijut 1 believe he will be forced to follow 
me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I would be on the otl'eusive : instead of guessing 
at what he means to do, he would hav(; to guess at my phms. The ditference in war is fuU 
twenty-tive per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochie. 

"Answer quick, as I knoAV we will not have the telegraph long. 

"W. T. SHKK.MAX, Major General. 

"I.ieut. Gen. Graxt." 

"CiTV PoiXT, Va., October 11, 1864—11.30 p. m. 
"Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be 
made, holding the line of the Tennessee river firmly, you may make it, destroying all the 
railroad .south of Daltou or Chattanooga, as vou think best. 

"U. S. GRANT, LU'iit. General . 
"Major Gen. W. 'I". Siir.UMAX.' 

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to the 
coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads leading cast and Avest 
through Georgia, to elfectually sever the east from the west. In other words, 
cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our 
gaining possession of the Mississippi river. General Sherman's plan virtually 
effected this object. 

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed move- 
ment, keeping his army in position in the mean time to watch Hood. Becoming- 
satisfied that Hood had moved westv/ard from (iadsden across Sand mountain, 
General Sherman sent the 4th corps, ^[ajor (."eneral Stanley commanding, and 
the 23d corps. Major General Schofield commanding, back to Chattanooga to 
report to Major General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he had placed in command 
of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry 



25 

division he (le.si<i'nc(I to move with tliroxiiAh (leor-j^'ia. With llie troops tluis left 
at liis disposal, there was little donlit that General Thomas could hold the line 
of the Tennessee, or in the event Hood should force it, Avould he ahle to con- 
centrate and heat him in hattle. It was therefore readily consented to that 
Sherman should start for the sea-coast. 

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he 
commenced his march, threateuina: both Augusta and Macon. His cominor-ont 
point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as he 
marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his 
own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such 
as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his 
movement, and sending Hood's army, the only considerable force he had west 
of Ivichmond and east of the Mississippi river, nortlnvard on an offensive cam- 
paign, left the Avhole coiuitry open, and Sherman's-ronte to his own choice. 

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the 
condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of Fort 
McAllister, on the Savannah river, and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st 
of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report. 

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two expedi- 
tions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg, Mississippi, 
Avere started by General Canby to cut the enemy's line of communication with 
Mobile and detain troops in that field. General Foster, commanding depart- 
ment of the south, also sent an expedition, via Broad river, to destroy the rail- 
road between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from Vicksburg, 
under command of Brevet Brigadier General E. D. Osband, (colonel .3d United 
States colored cavalry,) captured, on the 27th of November, and destroyed the 
Mississippi Central railroad bridge and trestle-work over Big Black river, near 
Canton, thirty miles of the road and two locomotives, besides large amounts of 
stores. The exjiedition from Baton Rouge w^as without favorable results. 
The expedition from the department of the south, under the immediate com- 
mand of Brigadier General John V. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand 
men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad river 
and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it moved 
TO strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about three miles from 
(rrahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified posi- 
tion, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of 746 
in killed, wounded, and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. 
On the 6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the 
Charleston and Savannah railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and Talilinny 
rivers. 

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which 
seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had 1 had the 
power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under 
which he seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October the advance of Hood's 
army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but failing to carry the place, 
withdrew towards Conrtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in 
effecting a lodgment on the north side of the Tennessee river, near Florence. 
On the 28th Forrest reached the Tennessee, at Fort Hieman, and captured a 
gunboat and three transports. On the 2d of November he planted batteries 
above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three 
gunboats and eight transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries 
upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The 
gunboats becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to 
prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and a half 
dollars' worth of stores and property on the levee and in storehouses was con- 
sumed by fire. On the oth the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north 



26 

side of tin; Teuiiossee river, above Johusonville, inoving towards Clifton, and sub- 
sequently joined Hood. On the uiglit of the oth General Schofield, with the 
advance of the 23d corps, reached Johnsonville, but tindinf^ the enemy gone, 
was ordered to Pulaski, and put in command of all the troops there, with in- 
structions to watch the movenumts of Hood and retard his advance, but not to 
risk a general engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command 
from Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted. 

On the 19th General Hood continued his advance. (General Thomas, retarding 
him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the purpose of con- 
centrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of re-enforccments. 
The enemy coming up with our main force commanded by General Schofield, 
at Franklin, on the oOth, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon 
until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. His loss in this battle 
was 1,750 killed, 702 prisoners, and .j,SOO wounded. Among his losses Avere 
six general officers killed, six Avounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was 
2,300. This Avas the first serious opposition the enemy met Avilh, and I am 
satisfied Avas the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the night General 
Schofield fell back towards Nashville. This left the field to the enemy — not 
lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned — so that General Thomas's Avhole force 
might be brought together. Tin; enemy followed up and commenced the estab- 
lishment of his line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December. 

As soon as it Avas ascertained that Hood Avas crossing the Tennessee river, 
and that Price Avas going out of Missoixri, General Rosecrans Avas ordered to 
send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's command and 
such other troops as he could spare. The ad\'ance of this re-enforcement 
reached Nashville on the 30th of NoA'ember. 

On the morning of the 15th of December General Thomas attacked Hood in 
position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the 
field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands most of his artillery and 
many thousand prisoners, including four general officers. 

Before the battle of Nashville I grew A'ery impatient over, as it appeared to 
me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience Avas increased upon learning that 
the enemy had sent a force of caA-alry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. 
I feared Hood Avould cross his Avhole army and give us great trouble there. 
After lu-ging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the 
offensive, I started Avest to superintend matters there in person. Reaching 
Washington city, 1 received General Thomas's despatch announcing his attack 
upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I Avas de- 
lighted. All fears and apprehensions Avere dispelled. I am not yet satisfied 
but that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before 
Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out Avith his 
Avhole force and given him battle, instead of Avaiting to remount his cavalry, 
Avhich delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable 
to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood Avas so complete 
that it Avill be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished ofiicer's judgment. 

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry 
and infantry, to the Tennessee river, being forced to abandon many pieces of 
artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th of December our adA-ance 
forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the 
river. 

About this time, the rains having set in lu^avily in Tennessee and North Ala- 
bama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery. General 
Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee river. A small 
force of caA^alry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, fifteenth Pennsylvania \-olunteers, 
continued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing considerable transpor- 



27 

tation and the enemy's pcntoou bridge. The details of these operations will be 
found clearly set forth in General Thomas's report. 

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major (Jeneral Grierson, started from 
Memphis on the 2Lst of December. On the 2oth he surprised and captured 
Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio rail- 
road, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for 
Hood's army, 4,000 new English carbines, and large amounts of public stores. 
On the morning of the ::iSth lie attacked and captured a force of the enemy at 
Egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars ; thence turning to the southwest, 
he struck the Mississippi Central railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories 
and large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine shops and public 
})roperty at Grenada, arriving at Yicksburg January 5. 

During these operations in 3Iiddle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under 
General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the 13th of November he 
attacked Generd Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and several 
hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what Avas left of his command, retreated to 
Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville, 
but withdrew on the ISth, followed by General Ammen. Under the directions 
of General Thomas, General Stonernan concentrated the commands of Generals 
Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's iStation, to operate against Breckinridge, 
and destroy or drive him into Virginia — destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and 
the railroad into Virginia as far as he could go without endangering his com- 
mand. On the 12th of December he commenced his movement, capturing and 
dispersing the enemy's forces wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck 
the enemy, under Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to 
Wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and 198 prisoners ; and destroyed 
Wytheville, Avith its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near 
there. Returniu"; to Marion, he met a force under Breckinrid";c, consistins;, 
among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville, that had started in pursuit. 
He at once made arrangements to attack it the ne.xt morning ; but morningfound 
Breckinridge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the 
extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight 
pieces of artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he re- 
turned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville. 

Wilmington, Nort'? Carolina, was the most impoitant sea-coast port left to 
the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and 
other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic 
value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of 
Wilmington, but with only partial eti'ect. The nature of the outlet of Cape Fear 
river was such that it rer|uired watching for so great a distance, that without 
possession of the land north of New inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for 
the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners. 

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a land force, 
which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced the assemblage in Hamp- 
ton roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most formidable armada ever 
collected for concentration upon one given point. This necessarily attracted 
the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal north ; and through the 
imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of 
service, the exact object of the cxtiedition became a subject of common discus- 
sion in the newspapers both noiih and south. The enemy, thus warned, pre- 
pared to meet it. This caused ;i postponement of the expedition until the latter 
part of November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assist- 
ant Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and 
went myself, in company with ]\[ajor General Butler, to Hampton roads, where 
we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time 
of starting. A force of 6,500 men was regarded as sufficient. The time of 



28 

starting Avas not definitely arranged, but it was tlionglit all would be ready by 
the 6tli of December, if not betbre. Learning on the 30th of November that 
Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilming- 
ton, I deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its 
destination before the return of Jh-agg, and directed General Butler to make 
all arrangements for the departure of Major General Weitzel, who had been 
designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained 
one moment. 

On the (jth of December the following instructions were given : 

" CiTV ToiN'r, \'.\., Dccciiihcr (), 18f)-l. 

" Genf.UAI. : Tlio first object ot" tlic expedition under Geueiiil Weitz*;! is to close to the enemy 
the port of \Vilniinp;ton. It" sueee.ssf'ul in this, tlie second will he to eajiture Wihninii'ton itselt". 
There are reasoniil)l(> ji-rounds to ho])e for .success, if ad\antaf!^e can be taken of the absence 
of the f»Teater ])ait of the enemy's forces uo\v lookin<i- after Shcinian in Georg:ia. The direc- 
tions you have <>'iven for the numbers and e(ini])ment of the expeditiini are all rip;lit, except 
in the uninij)ortant matter of where they embark and the; amonnt of intrenching; tools to be 
taken. The object of the exjjedition will be j^ained l)y (^ft'ectint; a landiug^on the main land 
l)Ctweeu Cape Fear river and tlie Atlantic, north of tlie north entrance to the riv(;r. ►Should 
such landinfi' be effected whilst the enemy still holds Fort Plsher and the batteries gnardinj; 
the entranci^ to the river, the>n the troops should intrench thems<>lves, and, ])y co-operating 
with the navy, effect the rediu-tion and capture of those ])laces. These in our hands, the 
navy could enter the harbor, and the jjort of Wilniinj^-ton avouUI be sealed. Should Fort 
Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immedi- 
ately on landino-, then it will be worth the ivttem])t to cai)ture "Wilmington by a forced march 
and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second 
will become a niatter of after consideration. 

"The details for execution are intrusted \,> you and the oftirer innnediately in command of 
the troo])s. 

"Should the troops under (reneral "Weitzel fail to effect a lauding at or near Fort Fisher, 
they will be returu(nl to th(> armie; operating against Richmond without d(>lay. 

■' V. S. GIJANT, JAcuUnant Gciural. 

" Major General 1!. 1". In ti.ei;." 
» 

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for 
this enterprise, and the territory Avithiu Avhich they were to operate, military 
courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. They 
Avere so sent; but General Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never 
received the foregoing instructions, nor Avas he aAvare of their existence until 
he read (Jeneral Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, 
with my indorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General 
Butler's accompanying the exj)edition until the evening before it got oif from 
Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General AVeitz(d had re- 
ceived all the instructions, and would be in command. I rather formed the idea 
that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explo- 
sion of the powder-boat. The (expedition was detained several days at Hamp- 
ton roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat. 

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any delay, 
with or Avithout the powder-boat, had been urged upon (xeneral Butler, and he 
advised to so notify Admiral IVirter. 

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at the 
place of rendezvous, off Ncav inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the CA-eningof the ];5th. 
Admiral I'orter arrived on the evening of the lyth, having put in at Beaufort 
to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming rough, making it diffi- 
cult to land troops, and the suj)ply of Avater and coal being about exhausted, 
the transport lh?et put back to Bt^aufort to replenish ; this, Avith the state of the 
Aveather, delayed tlie return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The 
powder-boat Avas exploded on the morning of tlie 2Ith, before the return of 
(ieneral Butler from lieaufort ; but it Avould seem from the notice taken of it 
in the southern newspapers that the enemy Avere never enlightened as to the 
object of the explosion until tliey Avere informed by the northern press. 



29 

Oil the 25tli a landinp; wa^ effected without opposition, and a reconnoissance, 
under Brevet Brigadier General Curti.s, pushed up towards the fort. But before 
receiving a full i-eport of the result of this reconnoissance, General Butler, in 
direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarcation of the 
troops and the return of the expedition. 

The re-embarcation was accom])]ished by the morning of the 27th. 

On the return of the expedition, officers and men — among them Brevet IMnj or 
General (then Brevet Brigadier (Jeneral) M. 11. Curtis, First Lieutenant G. W. 

^ Ross, regiment Vermont volunteers, First Lieutenant George W. Walling 

and Second Lieutenant George Simpson, 142d New York volunteers — volunta- 
rily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in 
their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss. 

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a despatch from the Secre- 
tary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me that the fleet 
was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper 
leader, the place could be taken. The natural supposition with me was that, 
when the 'troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. Find- 
ing it had not, however, I answered on the 30th of December, advising Admiral 
Porter to hold on, and that 1 would send a force and make another attempt to 
take the place. This time I selected Brevet Mnjor General (now Major General) 
A. H. Terry to command the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of 
the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, num- 
bering about 1,500, and a small siege train. The latter it was never found 
necessary to land. I communicated direct to the commander of the expedition 
I' the following instructions : 

" VvTY Point, Va., Janimnj 3, 18(55. 
" (lENKriAL : The expeditiou iiitrasted to your coiiiuiand has been iittcd out to renew the 
atteiii)it to capture Fort Fisher, N. C, and Wihiiiugton ultimately, if the fort tails. You 
will, tiieii, ])roeeed with as little delay as possible to the naval Heet lyino- otf Cape Fear river, 
and report the arrival of yourselt and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North 
Atlantic blockadiiio- squadron. 

" It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete uudcrstauding should exist between 
3'ourselt" and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral 
Porter freely and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, 
so that there may be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid 
down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his 
judgment and his nerve to undertake what he jiroposes. I would, therefi.ire, defer to him as 
naich as is consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get 
a firm position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate 
against that fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to 
defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open 
[ to the enemy. If such a position can l>e t)btain('d, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be aban- 
doned until its reduction is acccnnplished or another plan of campaign is ordered from these 
headquarters. 

"My own views are that, if you etfrct a landing, the navy ought to nui a portion of their 
fleet into Cape Fear river, while the balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces can- 
not invest I'ort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or re-enforcements, while the river is in 
possession of the enemy. 

"A siege train will l)e loaded on vessels and st'ut to Fort Monroe, in readiness to be sent 
^ to you if required. All other supplies can 1)0 dra\vn from Beaufort as you need them. 
r " Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. When you find they 

can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report 
for orders. 

" In case of failure to effect ii landing, bring your conunand back to Beaufort, and report 
to these headquarters for further instructions. You will not debark at Beaufort until so 
directed. 

" General Sheridan has been ordered to send a ilivision of troops to Baltimore, and place 
them on sea-going vessels. Tliese troops will be brought to Fort Monroe and kej)t there on 
the vessels until you are heard from. Should you require them they will be sent to you. 

" IT. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General. 
"Brevet Major General A. H. Tp:kry." 



30 

Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp, (now brevet brigadier gene- 
ral,) who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned in orders as cliief 
engineer to this. 

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those 
given for the first expedition ; and that in neither instance was there an order 
to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the 
commanding officer. 

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6lh, arriving 
on the rendezvous, off" Beaufort, on the Sth, where, owing to the difficulties of 
the Avealher, it lay until the morning of the 12lh, when it got under way and 
reached its destination that evening. Under cover of the fleet the disembarca- 
tion of the troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by 3 o'clock 
p. m. was completed without loss. On the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed 
to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken 
possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might 
be made from the fort. This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of 
the work had been seriously injured by the navy Are. In the afternoon of the 
15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate lighting was captured with 
its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, by the comljined efforts 
of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. Our loss 
was — killed, 110; wounded, 536. On the IGth and 17th the enemy abandoned 
and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's island, Avhicli were imme- 
diately occupied by us. This gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape 
Fear river. 

At my request Major General B. F. lUuler was relieved, and Major General 
E. O. C. Ord assigned to the eonnnand of the department of Virginia and North 
Carolina. 

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force which 
had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army threatening it, I determined to 
lind other fields of operation for General Thomas's surplus troops — fields from 
which they would co-operate with other movements. General 1'homas was 
therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications, 
at Eastport, in readiness for orders. <)n the 7th of January (Jeneral Thomas 
was directed, if he was assured of the departure of If ood south from Corinth, to 
send General Schoficld with his corps east with as little delay as possible. 
This direction was prom})tly complied with, and the advance of the corps 
reached Washington on the 2',>([ of the same month, whence it was sent to Fort 
Fisher and Newbern. On the 26th he was directed to send General A. J. Smith's 
comTnand and a division of cavalry to report to General Caidjy. By the 7th of 
February the whole force was en route for its destination. 

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department, and 
General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of .Major 
General Sherman. The following instructions were given him: 

"City Point, A'irgixia, January ;51, 1865. 
"GiiN'r.iiAL: * # * Your iiiovemciits aiv iuteiuli'd as co-operative 

with Slicnuau's throiifrli tlio States of Soutli aud Nortli Carolina. Tlie first point to bo 
uttiiiiR'd is to secnrc Wilminjjton. Goldshoro' will then lie your obji'Ctive point, nioviuji' 
eillicr from Wilmington or Nevvhcin, or both, as you deem best. tShould you not be al)le to 
reach (roldsboro', you will advance ou the line or lines of railway conuectin<j that iilace 
\\ith the sea-i'oast — as near to it as you can, y)uilding the road l)ehind yon. The enterprise 
under yon has two olyccts: th(^ first is to give (jeneral Sherman material aid, if needed, in 
his march north : the second, to open a base of sui)plit'S for him ou his line of march. As 
soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington orXewbcrn, you 
can best use for throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the accunnilatiou 
of twenty days' rations and forage for 6(),U0U men and '20,000 animals. You will get of 
these as nuiuy as you can house and jjrotect to such point in the interior as you may be able 
to occupy. I believe General I'alnier has received some instructions direct from (General 
Sherman ou the subject of securing supplies for his army. You can learn what steps he has 



-A 



31 

takcu, ami be g-ovenicJ in your riniuisitioii.s aceoidiiig-lv. A supply of ordiiaiico stovus will 
also lio iR'cessaiy. 

"Make all requisititms upon the eliiets oftlicir respective departments in the tiekl with me 
at City Point. Communieatc with nie by every opportunity, and should yon deem it neces- 
sary at any time, send a special 1)oat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can commu- 
nicate by teleo-rajih. 

" The supplies relerred to in thesi' instructions are exclusive of those rc(piired ibr your own 
conunaud. 

"The movements of the eniniy may justity, ni' even make it your inqierative duty to cut 
loose from your base and strike for the interior to aid Sherman. In such case you will act 
on your own jndp^mcnt, without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what 
you purpose doiiio-. The details for carrying- out these instructions are necessarily left to 
you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the im- 
])ortauce of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' 
any time from the 22d to the 28th of Febnuiry; this limits your tim(^ very materially. 

"If rolling stoclv is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supjdied from 
Washington. A large force of railroad men have already been sent to Beaufort, and other 
mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. On this point I hn\o informed you by 
telegraph. 

" F. S. (JKANT, Lieutenant Gcncnil. 

"Major General J. M. Sciiofiicld." 

Previous to giving- these instruction.^ I liacl visited Fort Fi.slier, accompanied 
by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of 
things, and personally conferring with General Terry and Admiral Porter as to 
what was best to be done. 

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah — his army entirely 
foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the southern railroads 
destroyed, so that it would take several mouths to re-establish a through line 
from west to east, and regarding the capture of Lee's army as the most impor- 
tant operation towards closing the rebellion — I sent orders to General Sherman, 
on the 6th of December, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with 
necessary garrison to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to 
City Point with the balance of his command. 

On the ISth of December, having received information of the defeat and 
utter rout of Hood's army hy General Thomas, and that, owing to the great 
difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to 
transj)ort Sherman's army, and doubting w^helher he might not contribute as 
much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, I wrote to him 
to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. A few 
days after this I received a communication from General Sherman, of date 16th 
Decendj(n'. acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and inf)rming me 
of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. 
Also that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to 
Columbia, Soutli Carolina, thence to llaleigh, and thence to report to me; but 
that this wduld consume about six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah, 
whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of January. The 
confidence he manifested in this letter of being abh; to march up and join me 
pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter of the ISth, I directed 
him, on the 2Sth of December, to make pre})arations to start, as he proposed, 
without delay, to break up the railroads in North and South Carolina and join 
the armies operating against Richmond as sdou as he could. 

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the 
23d corps. Major General Schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about 
21,000 men; that we had at Fort Fisher about 8,000 men; at Newbcrn about 
4,000; that if Wilmington was captured. General Schofield would go there; if 
not, he would be sent to Newbern ; that, in either event, all the surplus force at 
both points would move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with 
his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out; 
and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communi- 
cation with them. 



In obedience to lii.s instructions, General Scliolield proceeded to reduce Wil- 
mington, Nortli Carolina, in co-oporation witli the navy under Admiral Porter, 
moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear river. Fort Anderson, the 
enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, Avas occupied on the morn- 
ing- of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it. 

After fighting on the 20{]\ and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the 
morning of the rivJd, the enemy having retreated towards (Joldsboro' during the 
night. Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro' in two 
columns — one from AVilmington, and the other from Newbcrn — and to repair the 
railroads leading there from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by 
Cape Fear river, toward Fayetteville, if it became necessary. The column from 
Newbern was attacked on the 8th of March at Wise's Forks, and driven back 
with the loss of several hundred prisoners. On the 1 1th the enemy i-ene\ved his 
attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell 
back during the night. On the 14th the Neuse river was crossed and Kinston, 
occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wil- 
mington reached Cox's bridge, on the Neuse river, ten miles above Goldsboro', 
on the 22d. 

By the 1st of February General Sherman's whole army was in motion from 
Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th ; tlunice moved 
on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 
12th of i\[arch, opening up communication with General Schofield by way of 
Cape Fear river. On the 15th he resumed his march on Goldsboro'. He met a 
force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and com- 
pelled it to retreat. Our loss in the engagement was about 600. The enemy's 
loss was much greater. On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, iinder 
Joe Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and 
driving it back upon the main body. General Slocum, who was in the advance, 
ascertaining that the whole of .lohnston's army was in the front, arranged his 
troops on the defensive, intrenched himself, and awaited re-enforcements, which 
were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to Smith- 
field, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. From there Sherman con- 
tinued to Goldsboro', which place had been occupied by General Schofield on the 
21st, (crossing the Neuse river ten miles above there, at Cox's bridge, where 
General Terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon bridge, on the 22d,) 
thus forming a junction with the columns from Newbern and Wilmington. 

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston, South 
Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of February, 
and occupied by our forces on the ISth. 

On the morning of the olst of January General Thomas was directed to send 
a cavalry expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee, to penetrate 
South Carolina well down towards Columbia, to destroy the railroads and mili- 
tary resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to East Tennessee, by 
Avay of Salisbury, North Cai'olina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible. Of 
the feasibility of this latter, however. General Stoneman was to judge, Sher- 
man's movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the 
enemy could collect and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was 
so late in making his start on this expedition, (and Sherman having passed out 
of the State of South Carolina,) on the 27th of February I directed General 
Thomas to change his course, and ordered him to repeat his raid of last fall, de- 
stroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could. This would keep 
him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the enemy. I regarded it not 
impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from liichmond he might 
fall back to J^ynchburg and attempt a raid north through East Tennessee. On the 
14th of February the following communication was sent to General Thomas: 



'■City Point, Va.. I'ehninry 14, 1865. 

"General Ciiiiby is pv<']iariiio- a movpmeiit from Mobile bay ao;ain.st Mdbile ami the iuterior 
of Alabama. His force will consist of about 20,000 men, besides A. J. Smith's command. 
The cavalry yon have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksbin-g-. It, with the available 
cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation. Hood's army 
has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you r;:ave it in Tenn(»ssee, by desertion 
consequent tipon tlieir defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sher- 
man. (I talie it a larg-e jiortioii of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in 
the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Cong'resssaid a few days since in a speech, 
that one-half of it had been brouo-Jit to Soutii Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being 
true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will attract all tiie attention of the enemy, 
and leave the advance from your stand-point easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that ytm 
prepare as nuich of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to ^o south. The 
object would be three-fold : first, to attract as much of the enemy's f tree as ]iossiblo to insure 
success to Canby ; second, to destroy the enemy's line of couunujiioatious and military re- 
sources ; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Sel- 
ma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would 
not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion should 
be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information 
he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above. 

"Now that your force has been so much depicted, I do not know what number of men 
you can put into the field. If not more than 5, 000 men, however, all cavalry, I think it will 
be sufficient. It is not desirable tliat you should start this expedition until the one leaving 
Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will start, 
but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn. If you should hear through other sources 
before hearing from me, you can act on the information received. 

"To insure success, your cavalry should go with as little Avagon train as possible, relying 
upon the country ibr supplies. I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the 
number of batteries, and put tlie extra teams to the guns taken. Mo guns or caissons should 
be taken -with less than eight horses. 

"Please iulbrm me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think \o\\ will be 
to send under these directions. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant Gintrnl. 

"Major General G. II. Thomas." 

On the 15th lie was directeil to start the expedition as soon after the 20tli as 
he could get it off. 

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the 
armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the city, 
north of James river, should be cut otF. The enemy having withdrawn the 
bulk of his force from the Shenandoah valley and sent it south, or replaced 
troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to re-enforce Sherman, if practicable, 
whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, I deter- 
mined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which, if successful, would ac- 
complish the tirst at least, and possibly the latter of these objects. I therefore 
telegraphed General Sheridan as follows : 

"City Point, Va., Fcbruanj 20, 1S65— 1 p. m. 

"General: As soon as it is possible to travel I think you will have no difficulty about 
reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From theie you could destroy the railroad 
and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry 
should be left behind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information yon 
might get there would justify it, you could strike south, heading the streams in Vir<;inia to 
the westward of Danville, and push on and join General Sherman. This additional raid, 
with one now about starting from East Tennessee under Stoueuuui, numbering four or five 
thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one 
I'rom Eastport, Mississippi, ten tliousaud cavalry, Canby from Mobile bay with about thirty- 
eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Jlont- 
goniery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that 
will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to over- 
come great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last. 

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant Uencral. 

"Major General P. H. Sheridan." 

On the 25tli I received a despatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where 
Sherman was aiming for, and if 1 could give him definite information as to the 
3 G 



84 

points he might be expected to move on this side of Charlotte, North Carolina. 
In answer the following telegram was sent him : 

"City 1*(»ixt, \'a., i\hriuinj'2.'), 1^05. 

"General: Sbermuu'.s movenieiit.s will depeud on the iimount of opposition he meets 
with from the enemy. If .strongly o])pose(l, hi; may possibly liave to fall back to Georgetown, 
S. C, and fit out for a new start. I think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to 
that point lias passed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his 
way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynclibnrg, you will have to lie guided in your after move- 
ments by till' information you obtain, liefore you could ])ossil)ly reacli Sherman, I think you 
would find liini moving from (ioldsboro" towards Kaleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly 
posted at one or the otlier of these places, with railroad communications opened tioin his 
army to Wilmington or Newbern. 

" U. S. (JlxANT, Lk'iiUiKint (Iciurtil. 

"Major (xencral 1'. H. IShehidax." 

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with two 
divisions of cavalry, numbering' about 5,000 each. On the 1st of March he 
secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle 
fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 2d, the 
enemy having retreated on Waynesboro'. Thence he pushed on to Waynes- 
boro', where lie found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under Gen- 
eral Early. Without stopping to make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack 
was made, the position was carried, and 1,600 prisoners, 11 pieces of artillery, 
with horses and caissons complete, 200 wagons and teams loaded with subsist- 
ence, and 17 battle tlags, were captured. The prisoners, irnder an escort of 
1,500 men, Avcre sent back to AVinchester. Thence he marched on Charlottes- 
ville, destroying eftectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place 
he reached on the 3d. Here he remained two days, destroying the railroad 
toward Richmond and Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the 
north and south forks of the Hivanna river, and awaiting the arrival of his 
trains. • This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing 
Lynchburg. On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, 
he sent one to Scotlsville, whence it marched up the James lliver canal to New 
Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. 
From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to obtain 
possession of the bridge across the James river at that place, but failed. The 
enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned the bridge across 
the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moved down the railroad toward 
Lynchburg, destroying it as far as xVmherst Court-House, sixteen miles from 
Lynchburg ; thence across the country, uniting with the column at New Market. 
The river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the 
enemy having destroyed the bridges by Avhich he had hoped to cross the river 
and get on the South Side railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appo- 
mattox Court-House, the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or 
strike a base at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From 
New^ Market he took up his line of march, following the canal towards Rich- 
mond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable, 
to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the whole force at Columbia 
on the lOtli. Hen,' he rested one day, and sent through by scouts information 
of his whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at 
White House, which reached me on the night of the 12tli. An infcintry force* 
was immediately sent to get possession of White House, and supplies were 
forwarded. Moving from Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near 
Ashland Station, he crossed tlu.' Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges 
and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the Pamuuky 
to AVhite House, wliich place he reached on the 10th. 

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas : 



35 



"City Point, Va., Mmrli 7, 18o5 — 9.30 ti. m. 

" General: I thinli it will he ailvlnnlilc now iov you to ix'}i;iii' the luilroad iu East Ten- 
nessee, and throw a ti'ood I'oree iiji to Bull's Gap and tVirtit'y tlieii'. f^upplies at Kuoxville 
could always be ^ot t',ii\vard as re(iuir(;d. Yv'ith Bull's Gaji t'ortitied, you eaii occupy as out- 
posts about all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, it' it slioidd be refjuired of you iu the 
spring, to nvakc a eanijiaifyn towards Lyneliburg-, or into North Carolina. I do not think 
Stoneniau should break the road until he c;ets into Virginia, ludess it should be to cut off 
rolling stock that may lie caught west of th;it. 

''U. S. CilJAXT. I/utitcnant Gciientl. 

" Major (ieneral (;. H. Tiidaias."" 

Thus it will be seen tlint iu 31;ircl!, 1SG5, General Caiiby was moving an ade- 
quate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General Dick 
Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expe- 
ditions — one from IMiddle Tennessee under Brevet Major General Wilson against 
the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee under Major 
General Stoneman towards Lynchburg — and assembling the remainder of his 
available forces, preparatory to offensive oj)erations from East Tennessee; Gen- 
eral Sheridan's cavalry was at White House ; the armies of the Potomac and 
James were confronting the enemy under Lee in his defences of Richmond and 
Petersburg: General Sherman with his armies, re-enforced by that of General 
Schofield, was at Goldsboru'; General Pope was making preparations for a 
spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby )Smith and Price, west of the 
Mississippi; and General Hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of 
Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as 
might prove necessary. 

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it 
was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time the greatest 
source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong 
lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, 
before he was driven from them by battle, or I was prepared to make an effec- 
tual pursuit. On the 24th of March General Sheridan moved from White House, 
crossed the James river at Jones's landing, and formed a junction with the 
army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move 
General Ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy. 

On the 24th of JMarcli the following instructions for a general movement of 
the armies operating against Richmond were issued : 

" City Boint, Va., March 24, 1865: 

"General : On the '2yth instant the armies operating against Riclnnond will be moved by 
our left lor the double purpose of turning the enemy out of iiis present position around Peters- 
burg, and to insure the success of the cavalry luider General Sheridan, which will start at 
the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville railroads. 
Two corps of the army of the Botomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the 
two roads crossing Hatcher's run uearest where the present line held by us strikes that 
stream, both moving towards Dinwiddle Court-House. 

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under (Jeneral Davies, 
will move at the same time by the Weldon road and the .lerusaleui plauk road, turning 
west from the latter before crossing the Nottoway, and west w ith the whole cohunu liefore 
reaching Stony creek. General Sheridan will then move iudeitendently, under other iu 
structious which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the army of the 
Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the middle military division not re(|uired for 
guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to Brigadier General Benham, 
to be added to the defences of City Point. Major General Parke will be left in conunaud of 
all the army left lor holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point, subject, of course, to 
orders from the comnuxnder of the army of the Potomac. The Uth army corps will be left 
intact to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. 
If, however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps 
may he thrown back so as to occupy the jxisition held by the army \nioY to the capture of 
the Weldon road. All troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at 
the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given. 



36 

"Gcneval Ord will dctai-h three divi&ious, two white and one colored, or so much oi' them 
as he can, and hold his jiresent lines, and march lor tlie present left of the army of the 
Potomac. In the absence of further ord(«s, or until further orders are given, the wliit-^ divi- 
sions will follow the left column of the army of the Potomac, and the colored division the 
rig'ht column. Durin^r the movement Major General Weitzel will he left in command of all 
the forces remaining behind from the army of the James. 

"The movement of troops from the army of the James will commence on the night of the 
27th iustaut. General Ord will leave, behind the minimum ninuber of cavalry necessary for 
picket duty, in the absence of the main army. A cavalry expedition from General Ord's 
connnand will also be started from Stittblk, to leave there on'Saturday, the Istof A])ril, under 
Colonel ►Sunuu'r, tor the purj)os(^ of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, if acconi- 
pli-shed, will have to be a suri)rise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will bi^ suf- 
licient. They shotild, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from 
Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the Blackwater. The 
crossing should juobably be at Uniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the 
Weldon road he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads be- 
tween Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldon being fitted up for 
the pas.sage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of siipi)lies the 
enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with foin- days' 
rations in haversacks, and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as possible, 
and to give the army of the James "the same nund)er of days' supply with the army of the 
Potomac, General Ord will direct his commissaiy and (|uaitermaster to have sufficient su]i- 
plies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty roiuids of anununi- 
tion per man will be taken iir Avagons, and as nnicli grain as the transportation on hand will 
carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. The densely wooded country in 
which the army lias to operate making the use of nuich artillery impracticable, the amount 
taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of 
the army connnanders. 

"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation maybe commenced 
at once. The reserves of the 9th corps should be massed as nmch as possible. Whilst I 
would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they shoidd be 
ready, and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without 
waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could follow 
np, so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army. To prepare for this, the 9tli 
corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance ol" the army. General Weitzel 
will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at 
any point, he will do so. A success north of the James shoidd be followed up with great 
promptness. An attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached 
largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their 
local reserves, i>rincipally, for the defence of Eiclnnond. Preparations may he made for 
abandoning all the line north of the James, except enclosed works — only to be abandoned, 
however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy. 

" By these instructions a large part of the armii's operating against Richmond is left be- 
hind. ' The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest 
skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being.taken of it, whilst they hurl everything against 
the moving colunm, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon connnanders of 
troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. The 
very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost 
conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it jiarticularly enjoined 
upon cori)s commanders that, in case ot an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are 
not to wait for orders from the conunanding otficer of the army to which they belong, but 
that they will move promptly, and notity the connnander of their action. I would also en- 
join the same action on the part of division connnanders when other parts of their corps are 
engaged. In like manner. I would urge the importance of following up a repidse of the 
enemy. 

" U. S. GRANT, JAiutinaut (Icncral. 

"Major Generals Mkauk, Ord, and SiiiiitiDAN." 

Early on the moniin}; of tlio 2orli tin- enemy a.'^i^aultcd our liiicH in front of 
the 9th corps (which hehl from the Appomattox river towards our left) and 
carried Fort Steadman, and a part of the line to the right and left of it, cstahlished 
themselves and turned the f^uns of the fort against us; hut our troops on either 
flank lield their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was 
driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded and 1,900 prisoners. Our 
loss was 68 killed, 337 wounded, and 506 mis.^ing. Gentjral Meade at once 
ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. 
Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched 
picket line in front of the 2d and Gth corps, and 834 prisoners. The enemy 



37 

made desperate attempts to retake this line, but A\^itliout success. Our loss iu 
front of these was 52 killed, 864 wounded, and 207 missing. The enemy's loss 
in killed and wounded Avas far greater. 

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about Goldsboro', 
and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at 
City l*oint on the 27tli of March, and stated that ho would be ready to move, 
as he had previously Avritteu me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and 
rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command to 
bear against Lee's ai-niy, in co-operation with our forces in front of Richmond 
and Petersburg. General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten 
Raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston 
or thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and Danville railroad, 
striking it in the vicinity of Burkes ville, or join the armies operating against 
Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he was directed to carry into 
execution, if he received no further directions in the mean time. I explained t<i 
him the movement I had ordered to commence on the 29th of March. That if 
it should not prove as entirely successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry 
loose to destroy the Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the 
enemy of further supplies, and also prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's and 
Johnston's armies. 

I had sj)ent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that 
the enemy had retreated the night before. I was tirmly convinc. d that Sher- 
man's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to leave. With John- 
ston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming 
most of the summer, might become necessary. By moving out I woitld put 
the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction 
of the Danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of Lee and 
Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might 
otherwise save. I therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered. 

On the night of the 27th Major General Ord, with two divisions of the 24tli 
corps. Major General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the 25th corps. 
Brigadier General Birney commanding, and McKenzie's cavalry, took up his 
line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position 
assigned him near Hatcher's run on the morning of the 29th. On the 2Sth 
the following instructions were given to General Sheridan : 

"City Point, Va., March 1>8, 18(55, 
' ' General : The 5tb army cor])s will move by the Vaiiglm road at 3 a. m. to-morrow morn- 
ing. Tlie 2d moves at aboiU 9 a. m., baviiig but about three miles to march to reach the poiut 
designated for it to take on the right of the 5tli corps, after the hitter reaching Dinwiddle 
Conrt-House. Move your cavalry at as early an liour as you can, and withoiU being con- 
liued to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the 
5th corps, pass by its left, and, passing near to or through Dinwiddle, reach the right and 
rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in bis 
intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and attack tis, 
or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with yoiu' entire force iu your own way, 
and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dic- 
tate. I shall be on the tield, and will probably bo able to connnunicate with you. Should 
I not do HO, and you tind that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may 
cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you tind it practicable, I would like you to 
cross the South Side road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some ex- 
tent. I would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, 
which I would like you to strike as near to tlie Appomattox as i)ossible. Make your destruc- 
tion on that road as complete as possible. You can then pass on to the South Side road, 
west of Burkesville, and destroy that, in like manner. 

" After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which arc now the only 
avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further 
south, or you may go on into North Carolina and join Geneial Sherman. Should you select 
the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to 
meet you at Goldsboro'. 

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant Genera}. 
" Major General P. H. Sheridan." 



38 

On the morning of the 29tli the movement commenced. At night tlie cav- 
alry was at Dinwiddie Court-House, and the h'ft of our infantry line extended 
to the Quaker road, near its intersection with the Boydton plank road. The 
position of the troops, from left to right, was as follows : Sheridan, Warren, 
Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke. 

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the ca))ture of 
Petersbuig and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I tlierefore addressed 
the following comnumication to General Sheridan, having previously informed 
him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he 
received notice from me to do so : 

"(JRAVELLV C'lvEEK, Marcli 2[\ 1865. 

" Ceneral : Our line is now unbidkcu from tlie Anpouiattox to Diuvvidclic. We are all 
ready, however, to pjive up all, from the .Jerusalem plank road to Hatcher's run, wlienever 
the i'orees can be used advantageously. After fjetting into line south of Hatcher's we pushed 
forward to find the enemy's position. General (Jriftin was attacked near where the Quaker 
road intersects the Hoydton road, but repuLsed it easily, capturiuj^ about one hundred men. 
Humphreys reached Dalmey's mill, and was j)ushin<x on wlien last heard from. 

" 1 now teel like I'lidiug' tlu; matter, if it is possible to do so, before g'oing l)ack. I do not 
want you. therefore, to cut loose and ^o after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning 
push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to liis right rear. The movements of the 
enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one army 
liere until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The sigmil ofticer at Cobb's Hill 
reporied, at ]].'M) a. m., that a cavalry colunm had })assed that point from Kichmond towards 
Petersburg, taking forty miniUes to pass, 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieiiteninil (hiurnl. 

" Major General P. H. Siieridax." 

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the .3 1st the rain fell in such 
torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy 
roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridan advanced from 
Dinwiddie Court-House towards Five Forks, where he found the enemy in 
force. General Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton 
plank road to near the White Oak road, with a view of getting across the lat- 
ter ; but finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, 
was directed to hold on where he was and fortify. General Humphreys drove 
the enemy from his front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's 
mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations in their fronts to 
determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. Tbe two latter 
reported favorably. The enemy confronting us, as he did, at every point from 
Richmond to our extreme left, 1 conceived his lines must be weakly held, and 
could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined, 
therefore, to extend my line no fnrther, but to re-enforce General Sheridan with 
a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose ;iiul turn the enemy's 
right ilank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. The result of 
the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted Fort 
Steadman, particidarly favored this. Tlie enemy's intrenched picket line cap- 
tured by us at thit time threw the lines occupied by the; belligerents so close 
together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. 
Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys' corps, to report 
to General Sheridan ; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate move- 
ment. On the morning of the olst General Warren rejjorted favorably to get- 
ting possession of the White Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accom- 
plish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was 
attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the second division 
before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the third division, 
when the enemy was checked. A division of the 2d corps was immediately 
sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of 
the White Oak road gained. Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his 



39 

cavalry got possessiou of the Five Fork^i, but the enemy, after the affair with 
the 5th corps, re-enforced the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, 
and forced him back towards Dinwiddie Court-House. Hero (Jeneral Sheridan 
displayed great generalship. Instead of retreating witii his whole command on 
the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he de])loyed his 
cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of tiie horses. 
This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of woods and broken 
country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture he despatched to me 
what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie 
Court-House. General jMcKenzie's cavalry and one division of the 5th corps 
were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soon after, receiving a report from 
General Meade that Humphreys could hold our position on the 13oydton road, 
and that the other two divisions of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they 
were so ordered at once. Thus the operations of the day necessitated the send- 
ing of Warren because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was in- 
tended, and precipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of 
April, General Sheridan, re-enforced by General Warren, drove the enemy 
back on Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his 
strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between 5,000 and 
6,000 prisoners. About the close of this battle Brevet Major General Charles 
Griffin relieved Major General Warren in command of the 5tli corps. The re- 
port of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled ray mind 
lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon 
General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his ])osi- 
tion and open the way for retreat. To guard against this. General Miles's divi- 
sion of Plumphreys' corps was sent to re-enforce him, and a bombardment was 
commenced and kept up until 4 o'clock in the morning, (April 2,) when an as- 
sault was ordered on the enemy's lines. General Wright penetrated the lines 
with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him and to his left towards 
Hatcher's Run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was 
closely followed by two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the 
other division of General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines 
near Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the 
right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while 
General Humphreys pushed forward Avitli two divisions and joined General 
Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main 
line, captin-ing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. 
General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, returned General 
Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's lines immediately sur- 
rounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's corps, by a most gall.int 
charge, captured two strong, enclosed works — the most salient and commanding 
south of Petersburg — thus materially shortening the line of investment neces- 
sary for taking in the city. The enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated 
westward to Sutherland's Station, where they were overtaken by Miles's divi- 
sion. A severe engagement ensued and lasted until both his right and left 
flanks were threatened by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving 
from Ford's Station towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade 
from the front of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving 
in our hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the main 
road along the Appomattox river. During the night of the 2d the enemy 
evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated' toward Danville. On the 
morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed for the 
Danville road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General JMeade with 
the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville along the South 
Side road ; the 9th corps stretched along that road behind him. On the 4th 
General Sheridan struck the Danville road near Jettersville, where he learned 



40 

that Lee was at Amelia Court-House. He immediately iiitreiiclied himself and 
awaited the arrival of (Icneral Meade, who re.-ched there the next day. Gen- 
eral Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th. 

On the morning; of the oth 1 addressed M;ijor (ieneral Sherman the following 
communication : 

" Wilson's Station, April'}, 186"). 

"Gkni'.ral; All inclieations now are that Lee will attempt to roach Danville with the 
remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last nig'ht, reports all that is left, 
horse, foot, and draij^ooiis, at '2ll,0(K), much demoralized. We hope to reduce tliis number 
one-half. I shall push on to Hurkesviile, and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very 
few davs jro there. Jf you can ])ossil)ly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if 
we cannot tinish the jol) with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whetlier it will be better for 
you to strike for (ircensboro', or nearer to Danville, you w\\\ ho, better able to judge when you 
receive this. IJcbel armies now ar(* the only strategic jjoints to strike at. 

"II. 8. GRANT, Luutcniirtt (jcntrul. 

'• INIajor General W. T. SllKlOlAN." 

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that (Jeneral Lee was moving west 
of .Jettersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan moved with his cavalry, 
(the 5lh corps having been returned to General Meade on his reaching Jetters- 
ville,) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps 
pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several 
pieces of artillery. General Ord advanced from Burkesville toward Farmville, 
sendiig two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet 
Brigadier General Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This ad- 
vance met the head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked 
and detained until General Read was killed and liis small force overpowered. 
This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to get 
well up with the remainder of his force,. on meeting whicii the enemy immedi- 
ately intrenched himself. In the afternoon General Slieridan struck the enemy 
south of Sailor's creek, captured 16 pieces of artillery, and about 400 wagons, 
and detained him until the 6th corps got up, when a general attack of infantry 
and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of 6,000 or 7,000 prisoners, 
among whom were many general officers. The movements of the 2d corps and 
General Ord's command contributed greatly to 'the day's success. 

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one 
divi>ion. and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's Oourt-House ; the 6th 
corps. General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on Farmville, and 
the 2d corps by the High Bridge road. It was soon found that the enemy had 
crossed to the north side of the Appomattox ; but so close was the pursuit that 
the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at High Bridge before the 
enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. The 6tli corps and a 
division of cavalry crossed at Farmville to its support. 

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I ad- 
dressed him tin; following communication from Farmville : 

"Ai'KiL 7, 18G5. 

" Genf.kal : The result of the last week must convince you of tlie hopelessness of further 
resistance on the part of the army of northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, 
and regard it as mv duty to slnft from myself tlie responsibility of any further etfusion of 
blood liy asking of you the suriender of that portion ot the Confederate States army known 
as the armv of northern Virginia. 

"U. S. GKANT, Lktttcuant General. 

"General R. E. Li;i;." 

Early on the morning of the Stli, before leaving, I received, at Farmville, the 
following : 

"Ai'UIl7, 1865. 

" General : I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion 
you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army ot northern 



41 

Virpjiiiia, I refipvocatc your dosirc to avoid useless edfnsion of blond, and thorefoiP, before 
coiisideriiio- your pronositiou, ask the terms vou -will ofler ou condition of its surrender. 

"R. E. LEE, General. 
"Lieutenant General U. S. GuANT." 

T»> this I immediately replied : 

"April 8, 1865. 

" Gkneral : Your note of last evening^, in reply to mine of same date, askinp; the condition 
on wbich I will accept the surrender of tiie army of northern Virginia, is just received. In 
reply, I would say that pcarc beino- my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist 
upon, namely: tliat the men and utficers surrendered shall be disqualilied for taking up arms 
again against the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet 
you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at 
any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which 
th(! surrender of the armv of nortlieru Virginia will Ite received. 

"U. S.GRANT, Lieutenant General. 

" General R. E. Lkk." 

Early on tlie morning of" the 8th the pur.'^uit was resumed. General Meade 
followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the cavalry, 
pushed straight for Appomattox Station, followed by General Ord's command 
and the 5th corps. During the day General Meade's advance had con.'^iderable 
fighting with the enemy's rear guard, but was unable to bring on a general en- 
gagement. Late in the evening General Sheridan struck the railroad at Appo- 
mattox Station, drove the enemy from there, and captured 25 pieces of artillery, 
a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. 
During this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight 
received the following communication from General Lee : 

"Aprils, 18(55. 

"Genkral: I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did 
not intend to propose the surrender of tlie army of northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of 
your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the sur- 
render of this army, but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to 
know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a 
view to surrender the army of northern Virginia, but as far as your proposal may affect the 
Confederate States forces under my c(»nnnand, and tend to the restoration of ])eace, I should 
be pleased to meet you at 10 a. ni., to-morrow, ou the old stage road to Richmond, between 
the picket lines of tiie two .armies. 

"R. E. LEE, General. 

"Lieutenant General TT. S. Grant." 

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, and 
immediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox : 

"April 9, 1865. 

" General : Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the sub- 
ject of peace; the meeting pro])Osed for 10 a. m. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, 
however, general, tliat I am e(iually anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north 
entertains the same feeling. Tlie terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. 
By the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands 
of hunum lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping 
that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, &,c., 

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General. 

"General R. E. Lee." 

Oa the morning of the 9th General Ord's command and the 5th corps 
reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to 
break through our cavalry. The infantry was at once thrown in. Soon after 
a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending nego- 
tiations for a surrender. 

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the following 
from General Lee : 
4 G 



42 



"[Ai'Kii, y, J8G5. 
"General: I received your note of this morninn: on tlic picket line, wliitlicr I had come 
to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced iu your proposal of yester- 
day with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with 
the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that pur])ose. 

"R. E. LEE, General. 
"Lieutenant General U. S. GuAXT." 

Tho interview was liekl at Appomattox Court-1 louse, tlie result of whieli is 
set forth in the foil i wing correspondence : 

" Al'I'O.MATTOX COUKT-IIOUSE, Va., April 9, 18C5. 

"General: In accordance with the sul)stanc(' of my letter to }-on of the 8th instant, I 
propose to receive the surrender of the army of northern Virjrinia on the following: terms, to- 
wit : Kolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, ojie copy to be fjiveu to an 
officer to be desij^nated by me, tlu^ other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may 
desigcnatc. Tlie officers to five tiuMr individual paroles not to take up arms against the gov- 
ernment of the United States until properly exchanjjcd ; and each company or re<ximental 
commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and j)ul)lic 
property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers apjiointed by me to receive 
them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers nor their private horses or baggage. 
This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by 
United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they 
may reside. 

"U. S. GRA>'T, Lieutenant General . 

"General II. E. Lee." 

" Headquarters Army of Northern Virginl\, April 9, 1865. 
"General: I received your letter of this date containing the terms of the siuTender ot 
the army of northern Virginia as j)ro])osed by you. As they are snl)staiitially the same as 
those expressed in your letter of tlie Hth instant, they are accepted. I will j)rocced to desig- 
nate the proper officers to carrv tlu; stipulations into t'ffect. 

II. E. LEE, General. 
"Lieutenant General U. S. Grant." 

The command of Major General Gibbon, the -Ith army corps under Griflin, 
and McKenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at Appomattox Ooiirt-IIouse 
until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of 
the public property. The remainder of the army immediately returned to the 
vicinity of Burkesvillc. 

General Lee's great influence throughout the whcde south caused his example 
to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leader- 
ship are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands 
of our ordnance officers. 

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, (Jeneral Slierman moved directly 
against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Ivileigh, which 
place General Sherman occupied on the morniiiii' of the 13th. The day preced- 
ing news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at Smithfiehl. 

On the Hth a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and 
General Johnston, which resulted, on the 18th, in an agreement for a suspension 
of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of 
the President. This agreement was disapproved by the President oti the 21st, 
■which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to Gen- 
eral Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North 
Carolina, in obedience to your orders. Notice was at once given by him to 
General Johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into. 
On the 2oth another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on 
the 26th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandnient of Johnston's 
army upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee. 

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the 
20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck the rail- 



43 

road at Wytheville, Cliainbersburg and Big Lick. The force striking it at 
Big Lick puslicd on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying the important 
bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed H between New 
river and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro' on the North Carolina railroad; 
struck that road and destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro' and 
between Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of sup[)lies along 
it, and captured 400 prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of 
the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing 14 pieces of artillery and 1,364 
prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place he 
destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges toward Charlotte. Thence 
he moved to »Slatersville. 

General Caiiby, who had been directed in January to make preparations for 
a movement irom Mobile bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama, com- 
menced his movement on the 20th of March. The 16th corps. Major General 
A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish river ; 
the 13th corps, under Major General Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan 
and joined the 16th corps on Fish river, both moving thence on Spanish fort 
and investing it on the 27th; while Major General Steele's command moved 
from Pensacola. cut the railroad leading from Tensas to Montgomery, effected 
a junction with them, and partially invested Fort Blakely. After a severe 
bombardment of Spanish fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of April. 
During the night the enemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by 
assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured ; our loss was considerable. 
These successes practically opened to us the Alabama river, and enabled us to 
approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the city was evac- 
uated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of the 12th. 

The expedition under command of Brevet Major General Wilson, consisting 
of twelve thousand five hundred mounted inen, was delayed by rains until 
March 22, Avhen it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama. On the ist of April 
General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer 
Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three 
guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the Cahawba river. On the 2d he 
attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, defended by Forrest with 
seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval 
foundry, machine shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand 
prisoners. On the 4th he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa, On the 10th 
he crossed the Alabama river, and after sending information of his operations to 
General Canby marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, 
the enemy having abandoned it. At this place matiy stores and five steamboats 
fell into our hands. Tlience a force marciied direct on Columbus, and another 
on AVest Point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th. 
At the former place we got fifteen hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, 
destroyed two gunboats, the navy-yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and 
much other public property. At the latter place we got three hundred prison- 
ers, four guns, and destioyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. 
On the 20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, 
twelve hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General Howell Cobb. 
General Wilson hearing that Jeff". Davis was trying to make h s escape, sent 
forces in pursuit, and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of May 11. 

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby 
all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi. 

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby 
Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas, and 
Major General Sheridan designated for its immediate command ; but on the 26th 
day of May, and before they reached their destination, General Kirby Sra th 
surrendered his entire command to Major General Canby. This surrender did 



44 

not take place, however, until after the capture of tlie rebel pre^^ident and vice- 
president; and the had faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of iiis army 
and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property. 

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the govern- 
ment had taken refuge upon the soil of ]\Iexico, carrying witli them arms right- 
fully belonging to tlie United States, which had bi'en surrendered to us by 
agreement — among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person — and 
the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for troops to 
proceed to Texas were not changed. 

There liave been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat 
the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on 
our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I liavQ not 
mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports h(>re- 
witli submitted ; some in the telegrams and brief despatches announcing them, 
and others, I regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported. 

For information touching our Indi m difhculties, I would respectfully refer 
to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have occurred. 
It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the we-^t and the past fight 
batth's, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference in their fighting 
qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done. The 
western armies connnenced their battles in the i\Iississi|)i)i valley, and received 
the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in 
North Car()lina. The armies of the cast commenced their battles on the river 
from which the army of the Potomac derived its name, and received the 
final surrender of their old antagonist at Appomattox Court-House, Virginia. 
The splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories, removed all 
sectional jealousies, (of which we have unfortunately experienced too much,) and 
the cause of crimination and recrimination that nn'ght have followed had either 
section failed in its duty. All have a proud record, and all sections can well con- 
gratulate themselves and each other for having done their full sliare in restor- 
ing the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the United 
States. Let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, 
whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds 
of valor. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant General. 
Hon. E. M. Sta.\to.\, 

Secretary oj War. 

Adjuta.nt Gk.\i;rai/s Okfick, 

Nocemher 18, 1865. 
Official copv. 

E. 1). TOWNSEND, 

Assistant Adjutant General 



LIBRARV OF CONGRESS 



